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else by name. Although the testator ne-
glected to affirmatively bequeath his prop-
erty to his stepchildren, the will clearly 
expresses by negative implication his intent 
to leave his property to them. 
Implying a gift to the testator's stepchil-
dren in this case effectuates his intent and 
avoids disposing of his assets through in-
testacy. Consequently, I am persuaded 
that the testator's assets should pass under 
the will to his four stepchildren. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the concurring 
and dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: (Concurring and 
Dissenting) 
I would dismiss the appeal. 
Hunt quite plainly brought this appeal in 
hit capacity as personal representative of 
tlie estate. That much is clear from the 
notice of appeal filed by "Richard L. Hunt, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Reed Dwane Hunt" on October 6, 1989. 
Hunt then resigned as personal representa-
tive of the estate on November 9, 1989. 
No one has moved to substitute a successor 
personal representative as appellant in this 
appeal. Thus, there has been a failure to 
substitute parties pursuant to rule 38(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Utah R.App.P. 38(b). 
Whatever standing to pursue this appeal 
Richard L. Hunt as an individual heir might 
have, see Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 
P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989); Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 
1166, 1170-77 (Utah 1987); Terracor v. 
Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 
798-99 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Utah 1983); Strom-
quist v. Cokayne, 646 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 
1982); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 
(Utah 1978), acting as an individual, he is a 
separate entity from Richard L. Hunt, a 
personal representative. In light of his 
t. I agree with the majority that even if Hunt 
had not resigned as personal representative, he 
would have had difficulty establishing standing 
to bring an appeal acting in that capacity. A 
personal representative is barred from appeal-
ing where the issue on appeal concerns a dis-
pute between the decedent's heirs and the distri-
resignation as personal representative, 
Hunt has no authority to prosecute this 
appeal as personal representative, and 
Hunt, as an individual, filed no notice of 
appeal in this action. Therefore, Hunt has 
no standing to pursue this appeal.1 
The majority relies on rule 61 of the civil 
rules as a ground for treating as surplus-
age Hunt's designation of his status as 
"personal representative" in the notice of 
appeal. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. This is a 
plain misuse of the rule. The capacity in 
which one consciously takes an appeal is 
hardly "surplusage." And as the majority 
candidly notes, as a personal representa-
tive, Hunt almost certainly lacked standing. 
Standing, of course, is an issue that is 
never waived and can be raised by any 
party or by the court at any time. See 
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 798; Stromquist, 
646 P.2d at 747; Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 
1106, 1108 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Blodgett v. 
Zions First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 
(Utah CtApp.1988). 
If I were to reach the merits, however, I 
would affirm. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
No. 910150. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1092. 
Utah State Tax Commission deter-
mined that railroad owed sales and use 
bution requested docs not benefit the estate. 
See In re Yonks Estate. 115 Utah 292. 302. 204 
P.2d 452. 458 (1949) Sec generally PG Guth-
rie. Annotation, Right of Executor or Adminis-
trator to Appeal from Order Granting or Denying 
Distribution, 16 A.L.R.3d 1274. 1276-1300(1967 
& Supp.1992) 
UNION PACIFIC R 
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taxes on certain purchases and services. 
Railroad petitioned for review. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
railroad owed sales and use tax on its in-
state purchases of diesel fuel and ballast 
even though railroad transported materials 
for its own use outside Utah, and (2) rail-
road owed sales in use tax on some, but not 
all, services performed in Oregon on rail-
road's cross ties. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, va-
cated in part. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<S=>390 
Because courts should uphold agency 
rules if they are reasonable and rational, 
court should also uphold reasonable and 
rational departures from those rules absent 
showing that departure violated some other 
right. 
2. Taxation <£=>1233 
Railroad's purchases of fuel and bal-
last transported for its use outside Utah 
were not exempt from sales and use tax 
under exemption for Tax Commission's rule 
on interstate commerce for sales in which 
seller is obligated to physically deliver 
property across state boundary line to buy-
er; evidence showed that physical delivery 
occurred in Utah when vendors loaded fuel 
and ballast on railroad's cars and that ven-
dors had no obligation to deliver fuel or 
ballast out of state. 
3. Taxation <S=»1233 
Railroad's purchases of fuel and bal-
last transported for railroad's use outside 
Utah was not exempt from Tax Commis-
sion's rule on interstate commerce under 
exemption pursuant to which common car-
rier is deemed agent of vendor where deliv-
ery is made by seller to common carrier for 
transportation to buyer outside Utah; rail-
road took delivery of fuel and ballast in 
capacity of purchaser and consumer and 
not in capacity of common carrier. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
®=763 
Supreme Court applies no-deference 
correction-of-error standard to review 
v. AUDITING DIV. Utah 8 7 7 
876 (Ut»h 1992) 
claims of unconstitutional agency action 
under statute providing that appellate 
court may grant relief if agency action, or 
statute or rule on which agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16(4)(a). 
5. Commerce <s=374.5(2) 
Taxation <3=>1285 
Including costs of services performed 
in Oregon in basis of Utah use tax imposed 
on railroad's cross ties did not in itself 
impose burden on interstate commerce. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
6. Commerce «s=»71 
Commerce clause permits state to tax 
property which has become part of common 
mass of property within state. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
7. Commerce «=>74.5(1) 
Commerce clause does not prohibit 
state from including price of services per-
formed in manufacture of tangible proper-
ty in calculating basis for use tax levy. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
8. Taxation <s=>1285 
When state bases use tax on selling 
price of item of tangible property, basis 
necessarily includes cost of services be-
cause seller incorporates costs of services 
into selling price. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 3. 
9. Taxation <fc*1285 
State may include cost of services per-
formed in connection with tangible person-
al property that taxpayer already owns in 
calculating basis for use tax. 
10. Commerce <s=>74.5(l) 
Although state may include price of 
services performed in connection with 
tangible property in calculating basis for 
use tax, it cannot impose tax which discrim-
inates against interstate commerce. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
11. Taxation <S=»1285 
In order for state to include out-of-
state services in basis for calculating use 
tax, Constitution requires that those servic-
es be taxable if performed within state. 
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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12. Commerce <5=»74.5(1) 
If applied correctly, Utah Sales and 
Use Tax Act does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 
1, § 8, cl. 3. 
13. Commerce e=74.5(l) 
In reviewing construction and applica-
tion of Utah Sales and Tax Act in context 
of interstate commerce challenge, Supreme 
Court will uphold imposition of use tax on 
tangible property imported from out of 
state only if state could have taxed in-
volved transactions if they had occurred 
within state. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, § 8, 
cl. 3. 
14. Taxation <s=»1234 
Under Utah Sales and Use Tax Act, 
railroad was liable for sales and use tax on 
creosote treatment applied by independent 
contractor in Oregon to logs shipped by 
railroad in preparation for their use as 
cross ties; creosote treatment involved ap-
plying tangible personal property, i.e., creo-
sote, to other tangible personal property, 
i.e., cross ties. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-103. 
15. Taxation <s=»1234 
Railroad was not required to pay use 
tax for amount paid to independent con-
tractor in Oregon for milling logs into uni-
form size for use as cross ties and for 
drilling spike holes, which services were 
performed independently from sale of ties 
themselves; drilling and milling services 
were not "repairs or renovations" of tangi-
ble personal property. U.C.A.1953, 59-12-
103(l)(g). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
16. Taxation <3=>1319 
Court would not address portion of 
Tax Commission's order which agreed with 
auditing division that railroad improperly 
charged and collected sales tax on only 
9.82% of total repair bill for American As-
sociation of Railroads (AAR) repairs it per-
formed in Utah, but that railroad owed no 
tax deficiency in light of its long-standing 
practice of using that formula, which was 
uncorrected by several audits; Commission 
had not yet audited or assessed tax defi-
ciency against railroad. 
Robert A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for 
Union Pacific. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Rick Carlton, Salt 
Lake City, for Tax Com'n. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
In proceedings before the Utah State Tax 
Commission, Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany sought relief from a sales and use tax 
deficiency order imposed against it by the 
Auditing Division of the Commission Af-
ter a formal hearing, the Commission de-
termined that (1) Union Pacific owed sales 
and use tax on its in-state purchases of 
diesel fuel and ballast' even though Union 
Pacific transported the materials for its 
own use outside of Utah; (2) Union Pacific 
owed sales and use tax on certain services 
performed in Oregon on cross ties (com-
monly known as railroad ties) it owned; 
and (3) in the future, the Commission may 
assess a sales tax on the full cost of repair 
services Union Pacific performs on the rail-
cars of other carriers. Union Pacific now 
seeks review of these determinations. It 
also challenges the Auditing Division's im-
position of a penalty on the deficiency. We 
affirm the first determination, reverse the 
second, and decline to review the third. 
We also vacate the imposition of the penal-
ty and remand the issue for further review 
by the Commission. 
Because the issues have different factual 
backgrounds and standards of review, we 
set forth the facts and standard of review 
separately for each issue. 
I TAXABILITY OF IN-STATE PUR-
CHASES OF BALLAST AND FUEL 
USED OUTSIDE UTAH 
Union Pacific, through its fuel division 
located in Omaha, Nebraska, arranged to 
purchase diesel fuel from Amoco's Salt 
Lake City operation. Amoco loaded the 
fuel into Union Pacific tank cars and 
turned them over to Union Pacific at the 
1. Gravel or broken stone laid in a railroad bed 
UNION PACIFIC R. 
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railhead. Amoco's sales invoice specifies 
that Amoco delivered the fuel f.o.b. at 
Amoco's Salt Lake City operation and that 
a common carrier shipped the fuel. Union 
Pacific produced "waybill" 2 summaries in-
dicating the destination of each tank car of 
fuel. 
Union Pacific also generated waybills 
showing the destination of each railcar load 
of ballast purchased from three Utah ven-
dors. The vendors, MONROC, RME, and 
UP Resources, loaded the ballast into Un-
ion Pacific railcars, and Union Pacific then 
transported the ballast to its ultimate desti-
nation. One sales invoice for the purchase 
of ballast between MONROC and Union 
Pacific states, "It is hereby agreed that 
sale is consummated & title passes at plant 
site." The record does not include invoices 
or purchase agreements between RME or 
UP Resources and Union Pacific. 
Union Pacific did not pay sales tax on the 
portion of ballast it transported for its own 
use outside Utah on purchases from two of 
the three Utah ballast vendors. Nor did 
Union Pacific pay sales tax on the portion 
of the in-state diesel fuel purchases that it 
transported for its own use outside Utah. 
The Commission upheld a deficiency order 
against Union Pacific for sales and use 
taxes on these purchases. Union Pacific 
claims that the Commission's rules on inter-
state sales exempt these purchases. See 
Utah Admin.R. 865-19-44S. 
Section 16 of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) governs the stan-
dard of review in this matter. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16. Because Union Pacific 
claims that the Commission's decision does 
not comport with the Commission's inter-
state sales rule, possible grounds for relief 
include section 63-46b-16, subsections 4(a) 
and 4(h)(ii). Section 63-46b-16(4)(a) pro-
vides for judicial relief if the "rule on 
which [an] agency action is based[] is un-
constitutional on its face or as applied." 
Subsection (4)(h)(ii) provides for judicial re-
lief if agency action is "contrary to a rule 
of the agency." Union Pacific did not chal-
2. The record indicates that a waybill is a docu-
ment generated internally by Union Pacific to 
direct the route of freight cars and is distin-
v. AUDITING DIV. Utah 879 
876 (UUh 1992) 
lenge the constitutionality of the Commis-
sion's rule or its application. We therefore 
conclude that Union Pacific bases this 
claim on subsection (4)(h)(ii). 
[1] Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) refers to 
rules promulgated by the agency itself. 
Because courts should uphold agency rules 
if they are reasonable and rational, see 
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988), courts should also 
uphold reasonable and rational departures 
from those rules absent a showing that the 
departure violated some other right. We 
will thus employ an intermediate standard 
(one of some, but not total, deference) in 
reviewing Union Pacific's claim that the 
Commission erred in applying its rules. 
Union Pacific argues that the Commis-
sion's decision to assess sales tax on Union 
Pacific's purchases of fuel and ballast 
transported for Union Pacific's use outside 
of Utah does not comport with the Commis-
sion's rule on interstate commerce, codified 
at Utah Admin.R. 865-19-44S (rule 44S). 
The rule reads as follows: 
A. Sales made in interstate commerce 
are not subject to the sales tax imposed. 
However, the mere fact that commodities 
purchased in Utah are transported be-
yond its boundaries is not enough to con-
stitute the transaction of a sale in inter-
state commerce. When the commodity is 
delivered to the buyer in this state, even 
though the buyer is not a resident of the 
state and intends to transport the proper-
ty to a point outside the state, the sale is 
not in interstate commerce and is subject 
to tax. 
B. Before a sale qualifies as a sale 
made in interstate commerce, the follow-
ing must be complied with: 
1. the transaction must involve actual 
and physical movement of the property 
sold across the state line; 
2. such movement must be an essen-
tial and not an incidental part of the sale; 
3. the seller must be obligated by the 
express or unavoidable implied terms of 
the sale, or contract to sell, to make 
guishable from a bill of lading, which is a con-
tractual document with the vendor. 
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physical delivery of the property across a 
state boundary line to the buyerf.] 
C. Where delivery is made by the sell-
er to a common carrier for transportation 
to the buyer outside the state of Utah, 
the common carrier is deemed to be the 
agent of the vendor for the purposes of 
this section regardless of who is respon-
sible for the payment of the freight 
charges. 
Subsection A makes clear that the mere 
fact that Union Pacific transported the fuel 
and ballast out of Utah does not qualify the 
purchases for the interstate sales exemp-
tion. Therefore, Union Pacific must look to 
subsections B and C to exempt the fuel and 
ballast purchases. 
[2] Subsection B imposes three require-
ments that Union Pacific must meet to 
qualify for the exemption. Without exam-
ining the first two requirements, we con-
clude that Union Pacific did not qualify for 
the interstate sales exemption under sub-
section B(3) because the fuel and ballast 
vendors were not obligated to deliver Un-
ion Pacific's purchases outside Utah. Amo-
co's sales invoice for the purchase of fuel 
specified that Amoco delivered the fuel 
f.o.b. to Amoco's Salt Lake City operation. 
The sales invoice for the purchase of bal-
last from MONROC indicated that title to 
the ballast passed at MONROC's pit in 
Utah. Moreover, the record did not contain 
evidence of any contractual obligation of 
Amoco, MONROC, RME, or UP Resources 
to deliver Union Pacific's purchases across 
the state boundary.3 In short, the evidence 
supports the conclusion that physical deliv-
ery occurred in Utah when the vendors 
loaded the fuel and ballast on Union Pacif-
ic's cars and that the vendors had no obli-
gation to deliver the fuel or ballast out of 
state. We therefore hold that the Commis-
sion made a rational and reasonable deter-
mination that Union Pacific did not qualify 
for the interstate sales exemption under 
subsection B. 
3. Union Pacific points to internally generated 
waybill documents that direct the route of 
freight cars to substantiate its claim that rule 
44S exempts the ballast and diesel fuel purchas-
es transported for Union Pacific's use outside 
Utah. Waybills, however, are not negotiated 
(3] Subsection C presents the question 
of whether Union Pacific should qualify for 
the exemption because of its status as a 
common carrier. All railroad companies 
are common carriers under the Utah Con-
stitution. Utah Const, art. XII, § 12. Un-
ion Pacific argues that because subsection 
C treats a common carrier as "the agent of 
the vendor," when a common carrier deliv-
ers material out of Utah it is the equivalent 
of the vendor's making direct delivery to 
the out-of-state purchaser. The Commis-
sion rejected this contention, holding that 
Union Pacific took delivery of the fuel and 
ballast in the capacity of purchaser and 
consumer and not in the capacity of com-
mon carrier. 
Both Union Pacific and the Commission 
offer plausible constructions of subsection 
C of the interstate sales exemption rule. 
Although our conclusion might be different 
under a correction-of-error standard, we 
conclude that the Commission made a rea-
sonable and rational decision. Subsection 
C seems to contemplate a common carrier 
other than the buyer. The rule speaks of 
delivery to "a common carrier for transpor-
tation to the buyer." If the common carri-
er is the buyer, there is no need for trans-
portation to the buyer and the rule does not 
apply. Furthermore, while courts should 
generally construe taxing statutes favor-
ably to the taxpayer and strictly against 
the taxing authority, "the reverse is true of 
exemptions." Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 
(Utah 1980). We therefore affirm the Com-
mission's ruling on this question. 
II. TAXABILITY OF CROSS TIES 
In order to meet its cross tie (railroad tie) 
needs, Union Pacific purchased raw logs 
from various places and shipped them to an 
independent tie treating plant in Oregon. 
The plant treated the ties with creosote, 
drilled holes for spikes, and milled the ties 
between the vendor and the purchaser and do 
not obligate the vendor "by the express or un-
avoidable implied terms of the sale, or contract 
to sell" to make physical delivery of the proper-
ty across a state boundary. Utah Admin R. 865-
19-44S(B)(3). 
UNION PACIFIC R. 
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to ensure uniform size. After the treating 
plant completed this work, Union Pacific 
transported the ties to Utah and installed 
them there. Union Pacific then paid sales 
and use tax on them based only on the cost 
of the raw logs plus the cost of the creo-
sote treatment. The Commission upheld a 
deficiency order requiring Union Pacific to 
include the cost of the drilling and milling 
in the amount taxed on the cross ties. The 
Commission concluded that "the cost[s] in-
volved in creating the installed products, 
such as milling costs, represent services 
rendered in the repair or renovation of 
tangible personal property and are tax-
able," relying on Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
103(l)(g),4 and also concluded that "[i]t is 
the addition of those costs into the total 
cost of the cross ties that truly represents] 
the taxable value of the ties." Union Pa-
cific argues that the drilling and milling 
services do not fit the categories of taxable 
services contemplated by the statute. Un-
ion Pacific further contends that Utah's 
imposition of a sales tax on services per-
formed in another state unconstitutionally 
interferes with interstate commerce. 
[41 We review Union Pacific's constitu-
tional claims under section 63-46b-16(4)(a). 
Subsection 4(a) provides that an appellate 
court may grant relief if "the agency ac-
tion, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional 
on its face or as applied." We will apply a 
no-deference correction-of-error standard to 
review claims of unconstitutional agency 
action under this section. Questar Pipe-
line Co, v. State Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 
316, 317-18 (Utah 1991). Regarding the 
statutory construction issue, to the extent 
the legislature delegated to the Commis-
sion discretion to interpret the sales tax 
statute, we will review the Commission's 
construction under a reasonableness-and-
rationality standard; otherwise, we will ap-
ply a correction-of-error review to issues of 
statutory construction. See Morton InVl, 
4. Section 59-12-103(l)(g) states-
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser 
for the amount paid or charged for the follow-
ing: 
v. AUDITING DIV. Utah 881 
876 (Utah 1992) 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587-89 
(Utah 1991). 
A. Use Tax Based on Services 
Performed Out of State 
[5] Union Pacific claims that Utah over-
steps the constitutional boundaries drawn 
by the commerce clause by levying a sales 
tax on services rendered in Oregon. In 
order to analyze this claim, we must first 
examine the Utah Sales and Use Tax Act 
(the Act) and distinguish between the sales 
tax component and the use tax component 
of the Act. The Commission's rules differ-
entiate the two: 
A. The sales tax is imposed upon 
sales of tangible personal property made 
within the state of Utah, regardless of 
where such property is intended to be 
used, and on the amount paid or charged 
for all services for repairs and renova-
tions of tangible personal property or for 
installation of tangible personal property 
rendered in connection with other tangi-
ble personal property. 
B. The use tax is imposed upon the 
use, storage or other consumption of 
tangible personal property, and upon the 
amount paid or charged for the services 
for repairs or renovations of tangible 
personal property or installation of tangi-
ble personal property in connection with 
other tangible personal property, if the 
tangible personal property is for use, 
storage, or consumption in Utah; and, 
ordinarily, if the transaction does not 
take place within the state of Utah. 
C. The two taxes are compensating 
taxes, one supplementing the other, but 
both cannot be applicable to the same 
transaction. The rate of tax is the same. 
D. The distinguishing factor in deter-
mining which tax is applicable is normal-
ly the place where the sale or service 
takes place. If the sale is made in Utah, 
the sales tax applies. If the sale is made 
elsewhere, the use tax applies. 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of 
tangible personal property or services to in-
stall tangible personal property in connection 
with other tangible personal property[.J 
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Utah Admin.R. 865-19-1S. To recapitu-
late, the sales tax imposes a transaction tax 
on certain sales and certain services that 
occur in Utah. Complementing the sales 
tax, the use tax imposes an excise tax on 
tangible property and certain services per-
formed in connection with that property, 
where the property is stored or used in 
Utah but is not subject to Utah sales tax 
because it was purchased or the service 
was performed outside of Utah. See Bar-
rett Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 387 
P.2d 998, 999 (Utah 1964). 
If the owner of property used in Utah 
paid sales or use tax in another state, that 
tax is credited to offset the use tax levied 
in Utah.5 Because of the use tax, items 
used in Utah but purchased elsewhere 
share the same tax burden as those items 
purchased in Utah. The use tax, therefore, 
helps Utah merchants compete on equal 
terms with merchants in other states by 
removing the incentive for purchasers to 
search for states with lower sales tax in 
which to purchase items for use in Utah. 
See id.; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 
300 U.S. 577, 581, 57 S.Ct. 524, 526, 81 
L.Ed. 814 (1937) (Silas Mason); Paul J. 
Hartman, Federal Limitations on State 
and Local Taxation § 10:7 (1981). 
Union Pacific claims that Utah violated 
the commerce clause by levying a sales tax 
on services rendered in Oregon. In so 
claiming, Union Pacific misapprehends the 
nature of the tax imposed and how it re-
lates to the commerce clause. Utah levied 
a use tax, not a sales tax. Utah did not 
levy a tax on the sale of the raw logs and 
the services performed out of state; in-
stead, Utah taxed Union Pacific's use of 
cross ties within the state. 
For over fifty years, the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld the nondiscrimi-
natory application of a tax on the use of 
property that has come to rest in a state. 
See, e.g., Silas Mason; Wiloil Corp v. 
Pennsylvania, 294 U S. 169, 55 S.Ct. 358, 
79 L.Ed. 838 (1935). In Silas Mason, con-
tractors working on Grand Coulee Dam on 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28) exempts 
from sales and use tax "property upon which a 
sales or use tax was paid to some other state, or 
one of its subdivisions, except that the state 
the Columbia River objected to the state of 
Washington's imposition of a use tax. 
Washington taxed equipment the contrac-
tors used in Washington but had purchased 
out of state. The Washington tax scheme 
levied a "tax or excise for the privilege of 
using within this state any article of tangi-
ble personal property," including the cost 
of transportation from the place of pur-
chase. 300 U.S. at 580. The tax scheme 
also provided credit against the use tax for 
sales or use tax paid in Washington or in 
some other state. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo 
noted that items obtained through inter-
state commerce do not necessarily remain 
in interstate commerce. Furthermore, he 
recognized that because states can levy a 
tax on property within the state, they can 
levy a tax on the use or enjoyment of 
property: 
The tax is not upon the operations of 
interstate commerce, but upon the privi-
lege of use after commerce is at an end. 
Things acquired or transported in in-
terstate commerce may be subjected to a 
property tax, non-discriminatory in its op-
eration, when they have become part of 
the common mass of property withm the 
state of destination . For like reasons 
they may be subjected, when once they 
are at rest, to a non-discriminatory tax 
upon use or enjoyment. 
Id. 300 U.S. at 582, 57 S Ct at 526. 
[6-81 Hence, the commerce clause per-
mits a state to tax property which has 
"become part of the common mass of prop-
erty within the state." Moreover, it does 
not prohibit the state from including the 
price of services performed in the manufac-
ture of tangible property in calculating the 
basis for the use tax levy This is implicit 
in the nature of tangible personal property. 
Both raw materials and the services per-
formed in transforming those raw materi-
als into a finished article contribute to the 
value of an item of tangible property Con-
sequently, when a state bases a use tax on 
shall be paid any difference between the tax 
paid and the tax imposed bv [the Act) and no 
adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater 
than the tax imposed by (the Act] " 
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the selling price of an item of tangible 
property, the basis necessarily includes the 
cost of services because the seller incorpo-
rates the cost of the services into the sell-
ing price. The Court in Silas Mason, for 
example, upheld the Washington tax, which 
based the use tax on the total retail price of 
the construction equipment, not merely on 
the price of the unassembled component 
parts of the equipment. Id. at 579, 57 S.Ct. 
at 525. 
[9] A state may also include the cost of 
services performed in connection with 
tangible personal property that the taxpay-
er already owns in calculating the basis for 
the use tax. The basis of the Washington 
tax approved in Silas Mason included the 
service of transporting goods already 
owned by the taxpayer. Id. at 580, 57 S.Ct. 
at 525. In Halliburton Oil Well Cement-
ing Co. v. Reily, 313 U.S. 64, 83 S.Ct. 1201, 
10 L.Ed.2d 202 (1963), the Court again con-
sidered a state use tax that included the 
cost of services in the basis for calculating 
the tax. Halliburton involved a use tax 
levied by the state of Louisiana that includ-
ed the out-of-state costs of labor and shop 
overhead incurred in the manufacture of 
specialized equipment. The taxpayer man-
ufactured oil well cementing trucks and 
electrical well logging trucks in Oklahoma, 
some of which the taxpayer used in Louisi-
ana. Id. at 66, 83 S.Ct. at 1202. In exam-
ining the Louisiana use tax, the Hallibur-
ton Court did not object to inclusion of 
labor costs the taxpayer incurred in Okla-
homa in the basis for calculating the Loui-
siana use tax.6 We therefore hold that 
including the costs of services performed in 
Oregon in the basis of the Utah use tax 
imposed on Union Pacific's cross ties does 
not in itself impose a burden on interstate 
commerce. 
B. Discrimination Against 
Interstate Commerce 
[10,11] Although the state may include 
the price of services performed in connec-
6. The Court, however, ultimately struck down 
the Louisiana use tax An in state manufacturer 
of the same item would not have been taxed on 
the labor and overhead costs. Because the out-
of-state manufacturer faced a higher tax bur-
v. AUDITING DIV. Utah 883 
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tion with tangible property in calculating 
the basis for a use tax, it cannot impose a 
tax which discriminates against interstate 
commerce. The Halliburton Court stated 
that "equal treatment for in-state and out-
of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the 
condition precedent for a valid use tax on 
goods imported from out-of-state." Id. at 
70, 83 S.Ct at 1204. The following facts 
stipulated by the parties in Halliburton 
demonstrate the discriminatory impact of 
the Louisiana tax: 
If Halliburton had purchased its materi-
als, operated its shops, and incurred its 
Labor and Shop Overhead expenses at a 
location within the State of Louisiana, 
there would have been a sales tax due to 
the State of Louisiana upon the cost of 
materials purchased in Louisiana and a 
Use Tax on materials purchased outside 
of Louisiana; but there would have been 
no Louisiana sales tax or use tax due 
upon the Labor and Shop Overhead. 
Id. at 67, 83 S.Ct. at 1202. In order for the 
state to include out-of-state services in the 
basis for calculating the use tax, the Con-
stitution requires that those services be 
taxable if performed within the state. 
[12,13] If applied correctly, the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act does not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce. The 
Commission's rules provide, 'The use tax is 
a complement to the sales tax and the rules 
promulgated, when applicable, are common 
to both taxes." Utah Admin.R. 865-21-2U; 
see Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm %n, 
15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998, 999 (1964) 
(sales and use tax acts are correlative and 
complementary to each other). Moreover, 
courts should construe statutes so that 
they conform to constitutional mandates. 
Therefore, in reviewing the construction 
and application of the Act, this court will 
uphold the imposition of a use tax on tangi-
ble property imported from out of state 
only if the state could have taxed the in-
den, the Court held that the scheme discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce. Id. 373 U S 
at 75, 83 S.Ct. at 1206. See the discussion in the 
next section. 
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volved transactions if they had occurred 
within the state.7 
C. Application of the Utah 
Sales and Use Tax Act 
Union Pacific purchased raw logs from 
various vendors located outside Utah and 
paid sales taxes on these purchases. After 
acquiring title, the railroad shipped these 
logs to an independent contractor in Ore-
gon for creosote treatment and milling and 
drilling services in preparation for their use 
as cross ties. The railroad held title to the 
ties at all times after the initial purchase of 
the raw logs.8 Union Pacific paid use tax 
based on the cost of the raw logs plus the 
creosote treatment. However, Union Pa-
cific did not include the cost of drilling and 
milling services in calculating the basis of 
the use tax. 
The Act permits the state to tax "retail 
sales of tangible personal property made 
within the state," certain enumerated ser-
vices rendered within the state, and in-state 
storage, use, or consumption of tangible 
property purchased outside the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. The basis 
for the taxation of personal property and 
certain services rendered in connection 
therewith is calculated on the "amount paid 
or charged" for the sale or service. Id. 
The use tax, as discussed in section A 
above, mirrors the sales tax in its applica-
tion. Accordingly, the use tax should also 
be based on the amount paid for the raw 
logs and the amount paid for those services 
that are taxable under the terms of the 
statute. The only provisions that could 
conceivably apply to the milling and drilling 
services performed on the cross ties are the 
following: 
7. Union Pacific also claims that Utah's use tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce by 
subjecting Union Pacific to double taxation. 
We summarily dismiss this contention by point-
ing to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(28), which 
exempts from sales and use tax 
property upon which a sales or use tax was 
paid to some other state, or one of its subdivi-
sions, except that the state shall be paid any 
difference between the tax paid and the tax-
imposed by [the Act,] and no adjustment is 
allowed if the tax paid was greater than the 
tax imposed by [the Act). 
(g) services for repairs or renovations 
of tangible personal property or services 
to install tangible personal property in 
connection with other tangible personal 
property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible 
personal property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103. 
Union Pacific argues that drilling and 
milling are not the same as washing, clean-
ing, repairing, or renovating. The Commis-
sion found that 
the cost(s] involved in creating the in-
stalled products, such as milling costs, 
represent services rendered in the repair 
or renovation of tangible personal prop-
erty and are taxable. It is the addition 
of those costs to the total cost of the 
cross ties that truly represents] the tax-
able value of the ties. 
The notion of "taxable value" applied by 
the Commission implies that the Commis-
sion included the amount paid for the ser-
vices performed on the ties because those 
services added to the value of the ties. 
The "value" of the ties, however, is not the 
proper basis for calculating use tax. The 
basis for calculating use tax in the instant 
case is the amount paid for the raw logs 
when purchased plus the amount paid for 
services that fall into one of the specified 
categories of taxable services. 
[14] The Commission has attempted to 
classify the milling and drilling services as 
repairs or renovations. Because we con-
clude that the Commission has discretion to 
interpret the terms "repairs" and "renova-
tions," we review the Commission action 
for reasonableness and rationality. Utah 
Administrative Rule 865-19-78S (rule 78S), 
This exemption ensures that the state will not 
subject out-of-state sales and ser\ices to double 
taxation. 
8. These facts distinguish the instant case from 
our recent case of BJ-Titan Services v. State Tax 
Commission, 183 Utah Adv Rep. 20 (March 31, 
1992), in which we upheld imposition of sales 
tax on the cost of services performed incidental 
to and as part of the actual sale of tangible 
personal property. Id. at 2A. The services at 
issue in this case all occurred independently 
from and well after the sale of the property 
itself. 
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guides the taxation of services pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103: 
A. Persons who wash, clean, repair, 
or renovate tangible personal property, 
whether material is furnished by the sell-
er or not, are required to collect the sales 
tax upon the total charge made for the 
rendition of such services. 
B. Amounts paid or charged for in-
stalling tangible personal property in 
connection with other tangible personal 
property are subject to tax. 
The Commission found that the categories 
of taxable services contained in rule 78S 
provide for the taxation of the creosote 
treatment and the drilling and milling ser-
vices. The creosote treatment involved ap-
plying tangible personal property, the creo-
sote, to other tangible personal property, 
the cross ties. The creosote treatment is 
thus taxable.9 See BJ-Titan Servs. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 
1992). 
[15] Rule 78S, however, does not sup-
port taxing the drilling and milling services 
on logs Union Pacific had previously pur-
chased. Milling logs into uniform size and 
drilling spike holes do not involve the in-
stallation of tangible personal property. 
Furthermore, drilling and milling do not 
suggest the same type of activity as wash-
ing or cleaning. The Commission appears 
to view drilling and milling as equivalent to 
repair or renovation. Repair and renova-
tion, however, suggest activities that "fix" 
9. Union Pacific does not dispute this. In fact, 
as mentioned above. Union Pacific paid taxes on 
these services. 
10. Rule 865-19-5IS of the Utah Administrative 
Code (rule 5IS) supports the conclusion that 
services performed in the creation of a newly 
manufactured product arc not the same as the 
repair or renovation of an already manufac-
tured product. Rule 5IS provides: 
A. The amount charged for fabrication or 
installation which is part of the process of 
creating a finished article of tangible personal 
property must be included in the amount 
upon which tax is collected. Tftis type of 
labor and service charge may not be deducted 
from the selling price used for taxation pur-
poses even though billed separately to the con-
sumer and regardless of whether the articles 
are commonly carried in stock or made up on 
special order. 
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an already manufactured product. To re-
pair is to "restore by replacing a part or 
putting together what is torn or broken." 
To renovate is to "restore to a former 
better state." Webster's Ninth New Colle-
giate Dictionary 998 (1984). Drilling and 
milling the cross ties did not involve repair-
ing existing cross ties or restoring the ex-
isting cross ties to a former better state.10 
Thus, even under a deferential standard of 
review, we agree with Union Pacific that 
the drilling and milling services are not 
repairs or renovations within the meaning 
of section 59-12-103(1 )(g). We note that 
the witness for the Auditing Division ad-
mitted as much at the hearing before the 
Tax Commission, and this admission went 
uncontested. 
The proper focus is not on what Union 
Pacific "imported" into this state, i.e., fin-
ished railroad ties, but rather on the trans-
actions that actually took place, whether 
1
 inside or outside Utah, and the taxability of 
each transaction. The Commission errone-
ously adopted the former approach in con-
cluding that the drilling and milling servic-
es were taxable because they contributed 
to the "taxable value" of the ties. Union 
Pacific separately purchased raw logs, 
drilling and milling services, and creosoting 
services. Union Pacific paid taxes on the 
purchase of raw logs and the purchase of 
creosoting services. But none of the provi-
sions in the Sales and Use Tax Act permit 
the taxation of the drilling and milling ser-
B. Casting, forging, cutting, drilling, heat 
treating, surfacing, machining, constructing, 
and assembling are examples of steps in the 
process resulting in the creation or produc-
tion of a finished article. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 51S underscores that the cost of services 
performed prior to the sale of an item of tangi-
ble personal property must be included in the 
amount paid for the item for sales tax purposes. 
The rule includes an extensive list that illus-
trates some of the types of services taxable in 
the sale of a finished item of tangible personal 
property. Services performed on items owned 
by the taxpayer, however, may only be taxed 
under rule 78S. Moreover, rule 78S's omission 
of an extensive list similar to the list found in 
rule 5IS indicates that authority to tax services 
performed on items owned by the taxpayer is 
not coextensive with the authority to tax based 
on services performed prior to sale. 
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rices when performed independently from 
he sale of the ties themselves. We there-
ore hold that the Commission erred in 
•equiring Union Pacific to pay use tax for 
he amount paid for these services. 
III. TAXABILITY OF AAR 
CAR REPAIRS 
[16] Federal law requires Union Pacific 
o inspect for safety defects all freight cars 
eceived from other railroads that travel on 
Jnion Pacific's lines. Pursuant to rules 
promulgated by the American Association 
•f Railroads (AAR), Union Pacific repairs 
afety defects on freight cars and charges 
he railroad owning the defective freight 
ar for services and materials. According 
o a formula created in an audit prior to 
959, Union Pacific charged and collected 
ales tax on only 9.82 percent of the total 
epair bill for AAR repairs it performed in 
Jtah. 
The rationale behind the formula is that 
ince Union Pacific had already paid sales 
r use tax on the repair materials stored in 
& warehouse, the taxing authority needed 
0 adjust the amount of tax charged for 
epairs using those materials. The Audit-
ig Division has audited Union Pacific sev-
ral times since 1959 and has not instructed 
Jnion Pacific to discontinue the practice of 
ollecting sales tax on only a fraction of 
he total AAR repair bill. In this most 
ecent audit, however, the Auditing Divi-
ion issued a sales tax deficiency assess-
lent against Union Pacific, claiming that 
Inion Pacific's use of the 9.82 percent for-
lula was incorrect and that Union Pacific 
wed sales tax on the entire amount of the 
LAR repairs. 
On review, the Commission agreed with 
he Auditing Division that the 9.82 percent 
ormula was incorrect and that Union Pa-
ific should have collected sales tax on the 
ull amount of AAR repairs. The Commis-
ion, however, overturned the tax deficien-
y assessed by the Auditing Division. Be-
ause the use of the formula was a long-
tanding practice left uncorrected by sever-
1 audits, the Commission reasoned that 
mposing taxes for prior periods would con-
titute retroactive law making. Therefore, 
without assessing a deficiency, the Com-
mission ordered Union Pacific to collect tax 
on the total bill for AAR repairs beginning 
five days after the date of the Commis-
sion's decision. Union Pacific seeks relief 
from the prospective compliance required 
by the Commission's decision. 
We decline to address this aspect of the 
Commission's order because the Commis-
sion has not yet audited or assessed a tax 
deficiency against Union Pacific in this 
matter, but has determined only that one 
hundred percent of the charge for the AAR 
repairs will be taxable in the future. Un-
ion Pacific does not appear to contest the 
abstract proposition that services and mate-
rials furnished in AAR repairs are taxable, 
but contends instead that it is entitled to 
"credits or deductions" against this tax lia-
bility to reflect taxes it has previously paid 
on materials for repairs. The Tax Commis-
sion, however, should determine in the first 
instance whether Union Pacific can validly 
claim to have satisfied a specific portion of 
its sales tax liability for AAR repair 
charges or in the alternative whether Un-
ion Pacific's initial purchases of inventory 
for use in repairs should be tax exempt. 
The parties themselves have not squarely 
confronted this issue in the proceedings 
below or in their briefs, and the practical 
effect of the Commission's order is not yet 
clear. Union Pacific's implicit suggestion 
that the Commission's order creates an 
abuse of the state's power to tax is purely 
hypothetical. Accordingly, we conclude 
that it would be inappropriate for us to 
treat this issue at this time. 
IV. PENALTY ASSESSMENT 
The Auditing Division imposed a penalty 
on the deficiency assessment. Union Pacif-
ic did not contest the penalty before the 
Commission but does so before this court. 
The Commission may assess a penalty for 
negligent, intentional, or fraudulent under-
payment of tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
401(3). In applying the penalty, the Audit-
ing Division and the Commission should not 
mechanically assess a penalty in every case 
of underpayment. Instead, they should de-
termine in each case whether the taxpayer 
HALES SAND & GRAVEL v. AUDIT DIV 
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negligently, intentionally, or fraudulently 
underpaid. Because Union Pacific did not 
raise the issue before the Commission, we 
have no basis in the record upon which to 
review the imposition of the penalty. It 
does not appear, however, that either the 
Auditing Division or the Commission has 
made the finding of negligence, intentional 
disregard, or fraud necessary to justify a 
penalty under section 59-1-401(3). Be-
cause we are remanding this matter for 
other proceedings, we vacate the imposition 
of the penalty and remand this issue for 
reconsideration by the Commission and spe-
cific findings and conclusions regarding a 
penalty. 
Utah 8 8 7 
HALES SAND & GRAVEL, 
INC., Petitioner, 
AUDIT DIVISION OF the STATE 
TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Respondent. 
No. 910008. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 12, 1992. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the Commission's decision to 
assess sales tax on Union Pacific's purchas-
es of fuel and ballast transported for Union 
Pacific's use outside Utah. We reverse the 
Commission's decision to assess use tax on 
the drilling and milling costs paid by Union 
Pacific. We decline to address the Com-
mission's conclusion that Union Pacific will 
henceforth be required to collect sales tax 
on the full amount of repairs made on 
other railroads' freight cars under AAR 
regulations. Finally, we vacate the Com-
mission's decision to impose a penalty on 
the tax deficiency and remand the issue for 
a determination of whether Union Pacific's 
underpayment was negligent, intentional, 
or fraudulent. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
(O j!K(YNUMMtSWTtM> 
Sand and gravel seller sought review 
of tax deficiency and negligence penalty 
assessed by Tax Commission. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) 
charges for delivering sand and gravel to 
customers were subject to sales tax, but (2) 
failure to pay sales tax was not negligent. 
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. 
1. Statutes <s=>205 
In construing statute, court views it as 
a comprehensive whole rather than unrelat-
ed collection of provisions. 
2. Taxation <2=>204(1) 
Although taxing statutes are generally 
construed in favor of taxpayer, tax exemp-
tions are strictly construed against taxpay-
er. 
3. Taxation <S=1267 
Sales tax exemption for intrastate 
freight charges applied only to common 
carriers; accordingly, since sand and grav-
el seller was not "common carrier," deliv-
ery charges imposed by sand and gravel 
seller before title to sand and gravel passed 
were subject to sales tax. U.C.A.1953, 59-
12-104(18). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Taxation <S=>I282 
Passage of title is moment upon which 
sales transaction is to be valued for pur-
poses of computing sales tax. U.C.A.1953, 
59-12-103(l)(a). 
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[10th Cir.1986); Rccg v. Shaughncssy, 570 
F.2d 309, 317 (10th Cir.1978). 
J & M claims that the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in excluding the 
deposition since appellants made no show-
ing that Mr. Brown was unavailable or 
even unwilling to testify. In fact, J & M 
claims that there was no representation 
made that appellants even requested Mr. 
Brown to testify and that the use of his 
deposition was merely trial strategy to 
avoid revealing his demeanor to the fact 
finder. 
We have carefully scrutinized the tran-
script of the court's ruling and agree that 
no representation was made as to whether 
appellants had attempted to procure Mr. 
Brown's appearance. However, we con-
clude that appellants made a sufficient 
showing under rule 32(a) to have the depo-
sition admitted and that the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to admit it. 
[2] The element of discretion provided 
by the rule is a narrow one—exceptions to 
the preference for oral testimony apply 
"absent some compelling reason other-
wise." Nash v. Heckler, 108 F.R.D. 376, 
378 (W.D.N.Y.1985).2 The federal cases in 
which the issue has been considered have 
held that "the mere absence of the depo-
nent from the 100 mile area is sufficient, 
and the party attempting to submit the 
deposition into evidence need not proffer 
an excuse for the failure of the deponent to 
appear in court." Houser v. Snap-on 
Tools Corp., 202 F.Supp. 181, 189 (D.Md. 
1962); see also Stewart v. Meyers, 353 F.2d 
591, 696 (7th Cir.1965); Klepal v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 229 F.2d 610, 612 (2d Cir.1956). 
The reasoning behind the rule is simply 
that "it would be too burdensome to re-
quire a deponent beyond the distance of 
100 miles to appear at trial." United 
States v. International Business Machs. 
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y.1981). 
The rule applies equally to plaintiffs and 
defendants, see Richmond v. Brooks, 227 
F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir.1955), parties and 
non-parties. See 4A J. Moore & J.D. Lu-
2. Where there is no Utah case directly on point, 
we turn to the federal courts that have exam-
ined the comparable federal rule. See Heritage 
Bank A Trust v. London, 770 P.2d 1009. 1010 n. 
2 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ("As our rules of civil 
cas, Moore s Federal Practice § 32.05 (2d 
ed. 1989). The distance is measured "as 
the crow flies" from the deponent's resi-
dence to the courthouse. SCM Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., 77 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D.Conn. 
1977). 
The trial court apparency considered 
rule 32(aX3)(B)'s exception, "unless it ap-
pears that the absence of the witness was 
procured by the party offering the deposi-
tion," adjudged Mr. Brown to be a party, 
and concluded that by not being present, he 
had procured his own absence. Although 
Mr. Brown was not a named party, even a 
"substantial identity of interest" between 
the party offering the deposition and the 
deponent does not, without more, raise a 
"spectre of illicit procurement." Nash, 108 
F.R.D. at 378; Carey v. Bahama Cruise 
Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 204 (1st Cir.1988). 
"Procurement" implies that there was 
some collusion in having witnesses remove 
themselves from the reach of subpoenas or 
to deliberately absent themselves from the 
jurisdiction. Weiss v. Weiner, 10 F.R.D. 
387, 389 (D.Md.1950). Moreover, "procur-
ing absence and doing nothing to facilitate 
presence are quite different things." 
Snap-on Tools, 202 F.Supp. at 189. 
The proponent of admission has the bur-
den to show that the requirements of the 
ru/e have been met. See Parlato v. Inter-
port Trucking Co., 540 F.Supp. 1051, 
1052-53 (E.D.N.Y.1982). Appellants car-
ried this burden by presenting evidence 
that the deponent lived more than 100 miles 
from the courthouse. That evidence was 
never controverted. Nor is there anything 
in the record to suggest that Mr. Brown 
had procured his own absence. In fact, 
there is testimony that he moved to Mon-
tana "a little over two years" before trial. 
See, e.g., Bellamy v. Molitor, 108 F.R.D. 1, 
2 (W.D.Ky.1983) (party deponent had al-
ways lived more than 100 miles from court-
house); see also Starr v. J. Hacker Co., 
688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.1982). Appellants 
also specifically represented to the court 
that none of the named parties had pro-
procedure are fashioned after the federal rules, 
wc may properly look to authorities under the 
federal rules."); see also Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 692 P.2d 765. 767 n. 1 (Utah 1984). 
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cured the deponent's absence. It was pre-
sumably advantageous for appellants to of-
fer live testimony as opposed to deposition 
evidence, see Weiss, 10 F.R.D. at 388, 
which fact "is likely to limit frequent resort 
to this course." Richmond, 227 F.2d at 
492. 
Although the rules of evidence may offer 
an alternative means of admitting deposi-
tions,2 we need not address that alternative 
since we conclude that appellants made a 
sufficient showing to admit the deposition 
under Utah R.Civ.P. 32(a). It was estab-
lished, without dispute, that Mr. Brown 
was a resident of Montana at the time of 
trial, and had been so for a considerable 
time. Under these circumstances, we con-
clude that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in excluding the deposition. 
We further conclude that the error in 
excluding the deposition is substantial and 
prejudicial. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61. The 
proffer made by appellants adequately indi-
cates the materiality of the deposition evi-
dence to their case. Mr. Brown was presi-
dent of B & E and had the responsibility to 
negotiate contracts and to bid the work. 
Even the trial court believed Mr. Brown to 
be a "key witness" and the evidence to be 
"quite material." Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment against appellants, and re-
mand the case for retrial or for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
In light of this disposition, we need not 
address other issues raised on appeal. 
DAVIDSON and BILLINGS, JJ., 
concur. 
3. Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a) and the federal rules of 
evidence are cumulative, such that a deposition 
not falling within the provisions of rule 32(a) 
may still be admissible under the standards of 
Fed.R.Evid. 804. See 4 A Moore's Federal Prac-
tice § 32.02111. 32.05 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(a)); 
International Business Machs. Corp., 90 F.R.D. at 
384. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are compa-
rable to the federal rules. See Utah R.Civ.P. 
43(a) ("In all trials, the testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open court, unless other-
wise provided by these rules for) the Utah Rules 
(UuhApp. 1990) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Charles WEBB and John E. Humphrey. 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 890256-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 26, 1990. 
Defendant was convicted of aggrava-
ted robbery in the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., and 
defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) defendant 
had not received ineffective assistance of 
counsel on basis of conflict of interest, 
although codefendants were represented 
by two public defenders from same office; 
(2) defendant lacked standing to contest 
constitutionality of search of his house-
mate's purse; (3) substantial evidence ex-
isted upon which jury could reasonably find 
that defendant solicited, requested, com-
manded, encouraged, or intentionally aided 
codefendant in aggravated robbery of jew-
elry store with requisite intent; and (4) 
defendant's sentence for armed robbery 
conviction was properly enhanced under 
use of firearm statute, even though offense 
had already been enhanced to aggravated 
robbery due to use of deadly weapon in 
crime. 
Conviction affirmed; remanded for 
corrected sentence. 
1. Criminal Law <e=>1028 
In absence of exceptional circumstanc-
es or plain error, appellate court normally 
of Evidence "); see also Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at 
117. Moreover. Utah R.Civ.P. 32(a) provides 
that "[a] deposition previously taken may also 
be used as permitted by the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence." Thus, a deposition may be admitted if 
the deponent is unavailable as a witness. Utah 
R.Evid. 804(b). "Unavailability" is defined in 
several ways, and includes situations where the 
deponent "is absent from the hearing and the 
proponent of his statement has been unable to 
procure his attendance by process or other rea-
sonable means." Utah R.Evid. 804(a)(5). 
will not consider issues, even constitutional 
ones, that have not been presented first to 
trial court for its consideration and resolu-
tion. 
2. Criminal Law <$=*\ 130(5) 
Court of Appeals would not consider 
whether right to counsel guaranteed in 
State Constitution should be interpreted 
more expansively than federal provision, 
where defendant's appellate counsel simply 
asserted that different result should flow 
from state constitutional guarantee with-
out adequately briefing or arguing for dif-
ferent analyses under the State and Feder-
al Constitutions. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; 
Const Art. 1, § 12. 
3. Criminal Law <s=*641.5 
Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel includes right to coun-
sel free from conflicts of interest. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
4. Criminal Law «=>1035(7) 
Defendant who raises no objection at 
trial to multiple representation must show 
that actual conflict of interest existed 
which adversely affected his lawyer's per-
formance to prevail on claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
5. Criminal Law <£»641.5(4) 
Defendant who shows that he objected 
at trial to multiple representation need not 
demonstrate prejudice from conflict of in-
terest to establish ineffectiveness of coun-
sel claim. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
6. Criminal Law <s=641.5(6, 7) 
Mere fact that codefendants were rep-
resented by two attorneys from same pub-
lic defender office was alone insufficient to 
impose affirmative duty on trial judge to 
act sua sponte and appoint one defendant 
an attorney from different office or to in-
quire into propriety of representation. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
7. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(6, 7) 
Defendant's pretrial motion to sever 
his trial from that of codefendant did not 
impose affirmative duty on trial judge to 
later act sua sponte to inquire into proprie-
ty of representation of codefendants by 
two public defenders from same office, or 
to appoint different attorney for one defen-
dant, where one defendant was represented 
by privately retained attorney at time of 
motion, and ruling on motion was never 
requested or obtained. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 6. 
8. Criminal Law <s=»641.5(6, 7) 
Codefendant's motions captioned "Mo-
tions for Conflict of Interest" did not pro-
vide sufficient notice to trial court of poten-
tial conflict arising from representation of 
codefendants by two public defenders from 
same office, and thus did not impose af-
firmative duty on trial judge to act sua 
sponte and appoint different attorney for 
one defendant or inquire into propriety of 
representation, where "conflict of interest" 
referred to by motions appeared to be code-
fendant's disagreement with counsel over 
handling of pretrial identification issue, 
which had already been argued to, but re-
jected by, trial court. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
9. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(7) 
Trial judge, by virtue of abandoned 
pretrial severance motion, does not know 
or reasonably should know before or at 
trial of conflict of interest on part of attor-
neys, representing codefendants, and thus 
severance motion does not impose affirma-
tive duty on trial judge to act sua sponte to 
inquire into propriety of representation of 
codefendants. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
10. Criminal Law <s=>641.5(7) 
Defendant's postconviction motion for 
new trial could not constitute timely "objec-
tion at trial" to alleged conflict of interest 
on part of counsel, and thus trial judge 
could not be faulted for failing to act sua 
sponte and inquire into propriety of repre-
sentation of codefendants by two public 
defenders from same office. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Criminal Law <S=*1035(7) 
Defendant could succeed on his Sixth 
Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel 
STATE 
Cite as 790 P.2d 
claim only if he demonstrated both that 
counsel actively represented conflicting in-
terests and that actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected counsel's performance, 
where alleged conflict was not adequately 
raised in trial court until after conviction. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
12. Criminal Law <fc»641.5 
To show that actual conflict of interest 
existed on part of defense counsel, defen-
dant must point to specific instances in 
record to suggest actual conflict or impair-
ment of defendant's interest. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
13. Criminal Law <s=641.5 
Defendant's right to effective assist-
ance of counsel is not violated where con-
flict of interest on part of defense counsel 
is irrelevant or merely hypothetical; there 
must be actual, significant conflict U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
14. Criminal Law <s=641.5(6) 
Defense counsel's pursuit of united de-
fense with codefendant at joint trial did not 
show actual conflict of interest which 
would warrant finding that defendant re-
ceived ineffective assistance of counsel 
arising from representation of codefend-
ants by two public defenders from same 
office, although there was no eyewitness 
victim testimony identifying defendant as 
robber, where other witnesses testified to 
defendant's direct involvement before and 
immediately after crime, and codefendants 
took stand and gave entirely consistent, 
corroborative testimony to support their 
claim that others were the real culprits 
while they were only "patsies." U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
15. Criminal Law <3=>641.5<6) 
Defendant failed to demonstrate that 
any actual conflict of interest arising from 
representation of codefendants by two pub-
lic defenders from same office resulted in 
any adverse effect on his counsel's per-
formance, even though counsel chose to 
pursue united defense strategy; defendant 
apparently supported enthusiastically the 
united defense strategy until it produced 
unfavorable verdict, and there was no evi-
dence that strategy was prompted by de-
v. WEBB Utah f 
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sire or effort to bolster codefendant's d 
fense at expense of defendant. U.S.C., 
ConstAmend. 6. 
16. Criminal Law <e=>1044.1(2) 
Court of Appeals would not consid* 
defendant's allegation that police had n 
satisfied statutory prior demand requir 
ments prior to entering residence to mal 
arrest, where issue was raised for fir 
time on appeal, record did not show th 
statutory noncompliance ground was u 
known or unavailable to defendant befoi 
or at trial, defendant did not contend th; 
plain error exception should apply, and d 
fendant did not contend that any speci 
circumstances justified his failure I 
present such ground for motion to su] 
press to trial court U.C.A.1953, 77-7-H 
77-7-8. 
17. Searches and Seizures <S=D69 
Evidence showed that shotgun was 1< 
cated by officers in plain view while off 
cers were lawfully present in bedroom t 
arrest defendant, and thus shotgun wa 
not subject to suppression, even thoug 
shotgun may have been seized when polic 
reentered bedroom after arrest. U.S.CJ 
ConstAmend. 4. 
18. Criminal Law <S=>394.5(2) 
Proponent of motion to suppress ha 
burden of establishing that his own Fourt 
Amendment rights were violated by cha 
lenged search or seizure, as Fourth Amenc 
ment rights are personal rights which ma 
not be vicariously asserted. U.S.C.-A 
ConstAmend. 4. 
19. Searches and Seizures <s=>161 
Person who is aggrieved by illega 
search and seizure only through introduc 
tion of damaging evidence secured ty 
search of third person's premises or proper 
ty has not had any of his Fourth Amend 
ment rights infringed. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
20. Searches and Seizures <s=»162 
Factors relevant to determining wheth 
er defendant had legitimate expectation ol 
privacy in area searched include: whether 
defendant had any possessory or proprie 
tary interest in place searched or items 
seized in challenged search; whether de-
fendant was legitimately on premises; 
whether defendant had right to exclude 
others from that place; whether defendant 
exhibited subjective expectation that place 
would remain free from governmental inva-
sion; or whether defendant took normal 
precautions to maintain his privacy. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
21. Searches and Seizures <&=>162 
Defendant's ownership or possession 
of items seized in allegedly unlawful search 
is not determinative of whether defendant's 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights in place 
searched have been infringed. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
22. Searches and Seizures <s=162 
Defendant who establishes privacy in-
terest in place searched sufficient to con-
test legality of that search, in order to 
suppress evidence seized as product of it, is 
not deprived of Fourth Amendment stand-
ing to assert that claim merely because 
another person actually owns either eviden-
tiary items actually seized or personal ef-
fect in which seized items were found. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
23. Searches and Seizures <s=3164 
Defendant had standing to contest le-
gality of search of apartment rented by his 
housemate, where defendant testified that 
he actually resided in apartment with his 
housemate and their child in "common law 
marriage," ai.d that he contributed to 
household expenses, including rent. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
24. Searches and Seizures <s=*180 
Warrantless search conducted pursu-
ant to consent that is voluntary in fact does 
not violate Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
25. Searches and Seizures ^ ^ 
State has burden to prove that consent 
given to search was voluntary. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
26. Searches and Seizures <s=>201 
Voluntariness of consent to search is 
question of fact to be determined from 
totality of all circumstances. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
27. Criminal Law ®=>1158(2) 
Court of Appeals deferentially reviews 
a trial court's finding of voluntary consent 
to search, and will disturb it only if defen-
dant demonstrates that there has been 
clear error. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
28. Searches and Seizures <s=>184 
Fact that apartment occupant was un-
der arrest when she gave consent to search 
did not preclude finding that consent to 
search premises was voluntary. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 4. 
29. Searches and Seizures <s=5184 
State carried its burden of proving that 
apartment occupant's consent to search 
was voluntary, even though occupant was 
under arrest, where there was no evidence 
that officers continued to brandish their 
weapons once suspects were arrested, occu-
pant's infant son was placed near her to 
alleviate her fears for him, occupant was 
allowed to get up from floor six or seven 
minutes after arrest, occupant was allowed 
to drink coffee and use bathroom, and oc-
cupant signed straightforward consent-to-
search form. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
30. Searches and Seizures <£=»164 
Defendant lacked standing to contest 
constitutionality of search of purse, even 
though purse belonged to person with 
whom he had intimate relationship, and 
purse and its contents were in his home 
when challenged search occurred, where 
there was no evidence that defendant 
owned purse, had ever sought or been giv-
en access to purse, or had ever put any of 
his own effects in it. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
31. Searches and Seizures <s=>162 
Defendant's privacy interest in com-
mon residence does not necessarily extend 
to privacy interest in every object located 
inside that residence. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
32. Robbery <S>24.1(4) 
Substantial evidence existed upon 
which jury could reasonably find that de-
fendant solicited, requested, commanded, 
Cite 4» 790 l\2d 
encouraged, or intentionally aided code-
fendant in aggravated robbery of jewelry 
store with requisite intent, although there 
was conflicting evidence presented in sup-
port of defense theory that codefendants 
were innocent victims of setup by others, 
and defendant had receipt issued in another 
state by gas station at which another al-
leged coperpetrator's son worked. U.C.A. 
1953, 76-2-202, 76-6-302(1). 
33. Criminal Law <S=>1208.6(4) 
Defendant's sentence for armed rob-
bery conviction was properly enhanced un-
der use of firearm statute, even though 
offense had already been enhanced to ag-
gravated robbery due to use of deadly 
weapon during offense. U.C.A. 1953, 76-3-
203(1), 76-6-302(1 )(a), (2). 
Samuel Alba (argued), Sally B. McMini-
mee, Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants and appellants. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan Lar-
sen (argued), Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and 
BULLOCK » JJ. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Defendant Charles Webb challenges his 
jury conviction of aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978). He raises 
the following substantial issues: denial of 
effective assistance of counsel; illegal 
search of his apartment and of his mate's 
purse; and insufficiency of the evidence. 
He also challenges the sentence imposed. 
We affirm the conviction, but remand the 
case with instructions to correct the sen-
tence. 
FACTS 
In January 1987, Britt Martindale met 
defendant Webb and his girlfriend, Carolyn 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
65 (UtahApp. 1990) 
Gregersen, while in the hospital. Throup 
them, Britt met John Humphrey, wr 
stayed at her home for several days 
mid-October 1987. At that time, Britt live 
several blocks away from the apartmei 
shared by Webb, Gregersen, her ten-ye* 
old son, and their infant son. 
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on Octob< 
21, 1987, a bearded man held the owner ( 
a Salt Lake City jewelry store and a secut 
ty guard at gunpoint while he robbed th 
store of cash, jewelry, and diamonds wort 
approximately $40,000. The man ha 
pulled a sawed-off shotgun from a clot 
bag and directed the owner to put th 
contents of his safe and his display case 
into the bag. Before leaving, the robbe 
advised the two men not to try to follo\ 
him because he had "another guy" with 
gun waiting outside. At trial, the stor 
owner and the security guard identifie 
Webb's codefendant, John Humphrey, a 
the robber. 
According to the testimony of Britt Mai 
tindale, Webb drove up to her Midvate 
Utah, home in a Cadillac at approximate^ 
4:00 p.m. on October 21, 1987, with Greger 
sen in the passenger seat. Webb backe< 
the car into Martindale's driveway, cam< 
into her home, and spoke to her briefly 
He took the blanket off her bed and direct 
ed her to follow him outside to the car 
where he handed her one side of the blan 
ket and instructed her to hold it up. Webt 
told Gregersen to push the trunk release 
button inside the car. The trunk lid openec 
and inside Martindale saw Humphrey 
whom she had seen many times, including 
a day or two before October 21, 1987 
Everyone went inside her apartment, 
where Humphrey went into the bathroom 
and immediately began shaving off his 
beard. Webb went back outside and re-
turned shortly with a canvas bag and a 
sawed-off shotgun with black tape around 
the handle, which he handed to Britt She 
put the shotgun, which she later identified 
as the shotgun seized from Webb's bed-
room and put into evidence, on a shelf in 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
ro Utah 790 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
icr pantry, while Webb and Gregersen sat 
t her kitchen table and went through mon 
y, rings, and other jewelry, including loose 
lamonds, an opal, and a diamond watch, 
hat they removed from the canvas bag 
Vebb asked Humphrey's permission to 
lve the diamond watch to Gregersen, and 
hen did so Bntt later identified the dia 
lond watch taken from Gregersen's purse 
s the watch she saw Webb take from the 
anvas bag and give to Gregersen Mean 
rhile, Humphrey walked back and forth 
etween the bathroom and the kitchen 
rhile shaving, explaining how "he put the 
hotgun in some guy's face" and hand 
uffed a guard who had walked in on them 
febb said everything "went great" and 
lat it was a "little while before the cops 
bowed up " He placed the jewels in a 
aper bag and put the canvas bag in a 
itchen cupboard, telling Bntt not to "mess 
ith it" until he came back for it 
After approximately forty five minutes, 
ntt's husband, Russell Martindale, ar 
ved Ten minutes later, Webb, Hum 
^rey, and Gregersen left the Martindale 
3artment with the paper bag In a phone 
mversation with Bntt shortly thereafter, 
rebb asked if she had seen "it" on the 
>ws Webb returned to the Martindale 
)me a few hours later and left again with 
ie canvas bag, saying he was going to put 
in the river Webb and Humphrey re 
rned again at approximately 1130 pm 
fter Bntt gave Webb the shotgun, Webb 
id Humphrey left for Las Vegas along 
ith Russell Martindale 
On November 2, 1987, the police learned 
at Bntt might know something about the 
bbery The police interviewed her on 
wember 3 Based on the information 
e provided, the police obtained an arrest 
irrant for Webb, Gregersen, and Hum 
rey, who was staying at the Webb/Gre 
rsen home that night The warrant was 
ecuted by ten officers on the morning of 
>vember 4, 1987, at the apartment of 
ebb and Gregersen Gregersen was ar 
sted and handcuffed in the living room of 
e apartment Her purse was searched 
r weapons incident to that arrest, and the 
imond watch ultimately introduced by 
B State at tnal was observed, however, it 
was not seized until later at police head 
quarters While Gregersen's arrest was 
going on in the living room area, Webb and 
Humphrey were arrested in separate bed 
rooms and then brought to the living room 
area The police seized a shotgun from the 
bedroom in which Webb had been found 
A short time later, Gregersen signed a 
consent to search form During the ensu 
ing search of the apartment, conducted af 
ter the trio had been taken away, the police 
seized miscellaneous paperwork, some 
clothing, and jewelry, including a ring from 
Gregersen's jewelry box The diamond 
watch and the ring were both identified by 
the store owner as items stolen from him 
on October 21, 1987 
At their preliminary heanngs in late No 
vember 1987, Webb and Humphrey were 
represented by two attorneys from the Salt 
Lake Legal Defenders Association 
Webb's appointed counsel withdrew from 
representing Webb two weeks later at his 
arraignment and Webb privately retained 
attorney Ray Stoddard to represent him 
and Gregersen Humphrey continued to be 
represented by appointed counsel from the 
Legal Defender Association, Lisa Remal 
In early January 1988, Remal filed a mo 
tion to sever Humphrey's trial from Gre 
gersen s a motion in which Stoddard joined 
on behalf of Webb Also in Januarv 1988 
on behalf of Webb and Gregersen, Stod 
dard filed a motion to suppress the use of 
the shotgun, ring, and diamond watch as 
evidence After an evidentiary hearing 
the motion to sever Gregersen's trial from 
that of Webb and Humphrey was granted 
and the suppression motion was denied 
In earlv March 1988, Stoddard filed a 
motion to withdraw as Webb s counsel 
partlv based on unspecified "differences" 
between Webb and Stoddard about how 
Webb's defense should be conducted A 
few days later Stoddard filed a motion to 
se\ er Webb s trial from Humphrey s on the 
ground that substantially more evidence 
would be adduced against Humphrey and 
defendant Webb would be prejudiced by 
the jury s inclination to find him guilty bv 
association The motion to withdraw as 
Webb's counsel was subsequently granted 
STATE v 
CUc • • 790 P 2d 65 
and another attorney at the Salt Lake Le 
gal Defenders Association, Brooke Wells, 
was appointed to represent Webb, while 
Stoddard continued to represent Greger 
sen Webb's severance motion was not 
pursued by his new counsel After Webb's 
supplemental motion to suppress evidence 
seized from the apartment was denied and 
discovery was conducted, the codefendants 
proceeded to a joint trial m early June 
1988 
At trial, Bntt testified to the events at 
her house on October 21, 1987, recited 
above Russell Martindale admitted he had 
stolen a car at Webb's request that was 
used in the jewelry store robbery He had 
turned this car over to Webb in Salt Lake 
City on October 20, 1987 He stated that 
Webb had promised to pay his rent in ex 
change for the stolen car, and he denied 
knowing what was to be done with it A 
coat and hat found in that car matched the 
eyewitnesses' description of the clothing 
worn by the robber Russell also testified 
that, the night of October 21, Webb told 
him he knew someone in Las Vegas who 
could get rid of the stuff Webb and Hum 
phrey had stolen Russell was granted 
immunity from prosecution for car theft in 
exchange for trial testimony concerning 
the robbery 
Webb and Humphrey both testified and 
presented a united defense, claiming that 
they had been set up by the Martindales 
Webb stated that he had purchased the 
nng and watch from Bntt on November 2, 
1987, and had then given the nng to Gre 
gersen for her birthday He claimed to 
have been m Ely, Nevada, pursuing his 
occupation as a seller of gold, silver, and 
2 On appeal Webb contends for the first time 
that the right to counsel guaranteed in Article I 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution should be 
interpreted more expansively than the federal 
provision with the result that the state constitu 
tion would impose an affirmative duty on state 
trial judges to inquire into potential conflicts of 
interest any time codefendants are represented 
by members of the same law firm or public 
defender office As explained at greater length 
in the portion of this opinion dealing with the 
fourth amendment claims in the absence of 
exceptional circumstances or plain error, an 
appellate court normally will not consider is 
sues even constitutional ones that have not 
been presented first to the trial court for its 
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diamonds when the robbery occurred, and 
he introduced a gas station receipt from 
there dated October 21, 1987, the day of 
the robbery He admitted that he had 
pawned some diamonds in Las Vegas on 
October 22, 1987 Humphrey testified that 
he was staying at the Martindale apart 
ment on October 21 and that Bntt and 
Russell left the apartment about 3 00 p m 
that day and returned at 4 00 p m with a 
bearded man known to him only as Frank 
Frank carried a large bundle wrapped in a 
quilt into the back bedroom Humphrey 
said he never saw any weapon or jewelry 
After "cleaning up" by shaving his own 
beard off, Humphrey left with Frank and 
Russell about 5 00 p m to go to Las Vegas, 
where they met up with Webb, and Frank 
left them Humphrey stated he had seen 
Webb buy the diamond watch and a ring 
from Bntt at her home on November 2 
After the jury found Webb and Hum 
phrey guilty of aggravated robbery, Webb 
filed a motion for new trial claiming that 
his tnal attorney, Wells, had inadequately 
represented him because of a conflict of 
interest created by her desire to not make 
her colleague at the Salt Lake Legal De 
fenders Association, Humphrey's counsel, 
"look bad" The trial court denied this 
motion, and Webb's appeal was pursued by 
newly appointed private counsel 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
[1,2] Webb first claims he was denied 
the effective assistance of counsel guaran 
teed by the sixth amendment because his 
trial attorney jointly represented his and 
Humphrey's conflicting interests2 This 
consideration and resolution See State \ 
Anderson 129 Utah Adv Rep 15 16 (1990) 
State v Johnson 771 P2d 326 327-28 (Utah 
Ct App 1989) Even if that principle of appellate 
review were not a bar, we would still not re 
solve the state constitutional claim raised here 
Webbs appellate counsel simply asserts that a 
different result should flow from the Utah con 
stitutional guarantee without adequately brief 
ing or arguing for different analyses under the 
state and federal constitutions We need not 
address the important question of the parame 
ters of the Utah constitutional guarantee under 
such circumstances Bg, State v Wareham 
772 P 2d 960 966 (Utah 1989) (refusing to ad 
claim is based on the multiple representa-
tion of the two codefendants at their joint 
trial by two attorneys from the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association.3 
[3] The sixth amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel includes the right 
to counsel free from conflicts of interest. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). Ordinarily, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be analyzed un-
der the two-pronged test set forth in 
Strickland. Under that standard, a crimi-
nal defendant must show both that his 
counsel's performance was deficient and 
that it prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687, 
104 S.Ct at 2064; State v. Carter, lie P.2d 
886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Grueber, 776 
P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). However, a sixth 
amendment claim grounded on conflict of 
interest is a special subtype of ineffective-
ness claim, which must be examined under 
a somewhat different standard that was 
first enunciated in pre-Strickland cases. 
In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 
98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), one 
attorney was appointed to represent three 
codefendants. Before trial, the attorney 
objected to his continued representation of 
all three and requested the appointment of 
separate counsel because of the possibility 
for conflict arising from his receipt of con-
fidential information from the codefend-
ants. The pretrial motion for separate 
counsel was denied before trial and a re-
newed motion was again denied just before 
the jury was empanelled. Id. at 484, 98 
S.Ct at 1179. Because these efforts 
"brought home to the court" the possibility 
dress appellant's claim of unconstitutionality in 
the absence of legal analysis and supporting 
authority); State v. fuifferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 
n. 5 (Utah 1988) (appellate court will not engage 
in constructing arguments "out of whole cloth" 
on behalf of defendants). 
3. In Burger v. Kemp% 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 
3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), the United States 
Supreme Court considered a defendant's claim 
that the joint representation of himself and a 
coindictec at separate murder trials by two law 
partners denied him effective assistance of 
counsel because they had represented actually 
conflicting interests to his detriment. Although 
the Court noted that there was "much sub-
of inconsistent interests among the code-
fendants, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction because of the trial 
court's failure to appoint separate counsel 
or take adequate steps to ascertain wheth-
er the risk of conflict was too remote to 
warrant separate counsel. Id. The trial 
court's failure to investigate a potential 
conflict of interest based on multiple repre-
sentation brought to its attention in a time-
ly manner was presumed to be prejudicial, 
requiring reversal because it unconstitu-
tionally endangered the right to counsel. 
Id. at 483-87, 98 S.Ct. at 1178-80. 
The United States Supreme Court subse-
quently clarified that, although Holloway 
required trial judges to investigate any 
timely objections to multiple representa-
tion, the sixth amendment does not require 
state court judges to initiate sua sponte 
inquiries into the propriety of an attorney's 
representation of codefendants in every 
case: 
Defense counsel have an ethical obli-
gation to avoid conflicting representation 
and to advise the court promptly when a 
conflict of interest arises during the 
course of trial. Absent special circum-
stances, therefore, trial courts may as-
sume either that multiple representation 
entails no conflict or that the lawyer and 
his clients knowingly accept such risk of 
conflict as may exist. Indeed, as the 
Court noted in Holloway, supra, at 485-
486, 98 S.Ct. at 1179, trial courts neces-
sarily rely in large measure upon the 
good faith and good judgment of defense 
counsel. "An 'attorney representing two 
defendants in a criminal matter is in the 
stance" to the argument that such an arrange-
ment creates a possible conflict of interest, id., 
107 S.Ct. at 3120, it specifically assumed, with-
out deciding, that two law partners are con-
sidered one attorney for purposes of sixth 
amendment analysis. Id. In his appeal and 
before the trial court, Webb has assumed that 
two attorneys from the same defender office 
constitute a single attorney for purposes of sixth 
amendment analysis, and the State has not con-
tested the matter. We, therefore, proceed with 
our analysis of the ineffectiveness claim on the 
same basis, without considering or deciding this 
threshold question. 
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best position professionally and ethically 
to determine when a conflict of interest 
exists or will probably develop in the 
course of trial.'" 435 U.S. at 485, 98 
S.Ct. at 1179, quoting State v. Davis, 110 
Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973). 
Unless the trial court knows or reason-
ably should know that a particular con-
flict exists, the court need not initiate an 
inquiry. 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47, 
100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717-18, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 
(1980) (footnotes omitted); accord United 
States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790-93 
(10th Cir.1985) (sixth amendment does not 
require trial judge to initiate inquiry into 
potential conflict of interest when no party 
either objects to multiple representation or 
raises a conflict issue). 
[4,5] Noting that a possible conflict of 
interest inheres in almost every instance of 
multiple representation, the Cuyler court 
explained that the Holloway presumption 
of prejudice from a possible conflict of 
interest is only appropriate in cases where 
the trial court did not provide an objecting 
defendant with an "opportunity to show 
that potential conflicts impermissibly im-
peril his right to a fair trial." Cuyler, 446 
U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. The Court 
reaffirmed that multiple representation 
does not violate the sixth amendment un-
less it gives rise to a conflict of interest, 
holding that the possibility that multiple 
representation involved a conflict of inter-
ests is insufficient to impugn a criminal 
conviction. Id. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719; 
see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 
S.Ct 3114, 3120, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (per-
mitting joint representation of codefend-
ants is not per se violation of sixth amend-
ment guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel); Thomas v. Foltz, 818 F.2d 476, 
481 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 870, 
108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149 (1987). 
Therefore, a defendant who raises no objec-
tion at trial to multiple representation must 
show that an actual conflict of interest 
existed which adversely affected his law-
yer's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 
348,100 S.Ct. at 1718; Thomas, 818 F.2d at 
480; Fitzpatrick v. McCormack, 869 F.2d 
1247 (9th Cir.1989). A defendant who 
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makes such a showing need not demon 
strate prejudice to establish an ineffective 
ness of counsel claim. Cuyler, 446 U.S. a 
349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1718-19; see Thomas 
818 F.2d at 480 n. 3. 
The reasons for presuming prejudice ii 
conflict of interest cases meeting this stan 
dard, which is less rigorous than th< 
Strickland test generally applicable to in 
effective counsel claims, was explained ii 
Strickland itself: 
In Cuyler . . . [we] held that prejudice u 
presumed when counsel is burdened b} 
an actual conflict of interest In thos< 
circumstances, counsel breaches the dutj 
of loyalty, perhaps the most basic o1 
counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficull 
to measure the precise effect on the de 
fense of representation corrupted by con 
flicting interests. Given the obligatior 
of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest 
and the ability of trial courts to make an 
early inquiry in certain situations likely 
to give rise to conflicts . . . it is reason-
able for the criminal justice system to 
maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed 
prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even 
so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of 
prejudice that exists for the Sixth 
Amendment claims mentioned above [i.e., 
actual or constructive denial of the as-
sistance of counsel altogether]. Preju-
dice is presumed only if the defendant 
demonstrates that counsel "actively rep-
resented conflicting interests" and that 
"an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer's performance." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 
2067 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 
S.Ct. at 1719); accord Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 
3120. 
In this case, although no specific objec-
tion to joint representation of Webb and 
Humphrey by two public defenders was 
ever raised until after his conviction, Webb 
contends that the trial court knew or 
should have known about the possibility 
that the defenders were representing con-
flicting interests and that the trial court's 
failure, on its own motion, to either appoint 
Webb counsel who was not a public defend-
er or inquire further into the issue before 
or during trial violated his sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct 
at 1719; United States v. Akinseye, 802 
F.2d 740, 744-46 (4th Cir.1986) (absent a 
specific conflict objection, trial court may 
assume that joint representation does not 
involve any conflict unless court knows or 
has reason to know that particular conflict 
exists), cert, denied sub nom. Ayodcji v. 
United States, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3190, 
96 LEd.2d 678 (1987). Reversal and re-
mand for a new trial are required as in 
Holloway, Webb argues, because he has 
demonstrated a potential conflict of inter-
est, from which prejudice must be pre-
sumed. 
In support of his argument that the trial 
judge violated a sixth amendment duty to 
investigate further the potential conflict of 
interest, Webb contends that the following 
were sufficient to bring to the trial court's 
attention the potential for conflict arising 
from joint representation of him and Hum-
phrey by two attorneys from the Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders Association (SLLDA): (1) 
his March 1988 motion to sever his trial 
from that of Humphrey; (2) the trial 
court's appointment of the two SLLDA at-
torneys to represent two codefendants; 
and (3) his post-conviction motion for new 
trial. 
[6] In Cuyler, as noted above, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court rejected the prop-
osition that the representation of codefend-
ants by a single attorney was, in and of 
itself, a "special circumstance" from which 
a trial judge "knows or reasonably should 
know that a particular conflict" of interest 
exists, thereby creating a duty on the court 
to inquire further into the conflict. In this 
case, therefore, the fact of representation 
of Webb and Humphrey by two SLLDA 
4. In his reply brief, Webb also alludes to Hum-
phrey's April and May 1988 handwritten pro sc 
motions, both captioned "Motions for Conflict 
of Interest," as providing sufficient notice to the 
trial court of a potential conflict arising from 
representation of the codefendants by the two 
public defenders. In his motion, Humphrey 
asserted that Webb would be deprived of a fair 
trial if the robbery victims were allowed to 
identify Humphrey as the robber at trial since, 
Humphrey claimed, their pretrial identification 
attorneys is alone insufficient to impose 
such a duty on the trial judge. See State 
v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982) (no 
presumption of prejudice arising solely 
from multiple representation of codefend-
ants by attorneys from same public defend-
er office). 
[7-9] We reach the same conclusion re-
garding the duty of the trial judge in this 
case even when the codefendants' joint rep-
resentation at trial by SLLDA lawyers is 
viewed in light of the fact that the case file 
contained Webb's pretrial motion to sever 
his trial from Humphrey's. At the time the 
motion was filed, the codefendants were 
not represented by the two defenders. 
Webb was still represented by a private 
retained attorney and Humphrey was rep-
resented by a public defender. After Wells 
was appointed to replace Stoddard as 
Webb's counsel nearly three months before 
trial, the codefendants did nothing to alert 
the trial judge to a potential or actual con-
flict between them.4 There is nothing in 
this record to suggest that the trial judge 
actually knew of the vague, general asser-
tions in the earlier severance motion about 
the difference in the quantum of evidence 
that would allegedly be presented at trial 
against the codefendants. No hearing on 
the severance motion was requested or 
held; likewise, no ruling on the motion was 
requested or obtained. In the absence of 
other facts or circumstances that should 
reasonably bring a conflict of interests be-
tween codefendants to the trial court's at-
tention, we decline to hold that, for pur-
poses of invoking the rule set forth in 
Holloway and Cuyler, a trial judge "knows 
or reasonably should know" before or at 
trial of a conflict suggested in an aban-
doned pretrial severance motion. By the 
time of trial, the trial judge in this case 
of him was unconstitutional. The "conflict of 
interest" referred to by the caption on Hum-
phrey's motions appears to be Humphrey's dis-
agreement with counsel over the handling of 
this pretrial identification issue, which had al-
ready been argued to, but rejected by, the trial 
court. In light of the court's resolution of Hum-
phrey's claims, these motions were insufficient 
to alert the trial court to any potential conflict 
of interests. 
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could reasonably assume that, in the face 
of the State's evidence linking Webb and 
Humphrey and in spite of the victims' iden-
tification of Humphrey, Webb's trial coun-
sel had made a tactical decision not to 
pursue a defense based on disassociating 
Webb from Humphrey but to press a unit-
ed defense—i.e., that both codefendants 
were framed by the Martindales and that 
the identification of Humphrey by the rob-
bery victims was erroneous—at one trial. 
There was nothing at the trial itself sug-
gesting to the trial judge that Webb's legal 
representation was in any way compro-
mised by the other public defender's repre-
sentation of Humphrey. On the contrary, 
the judge could see at trial that Webb was 
actively participating in the joint defense, 
an affirmative indication that Webb con-
sidered the codefendants' interests as be-
ing in harmony, not in conflict. 
[10] Finally, we reject out-of-hand 
Webb's absurd contention that his post-con-
viction motion for new trial was the timely 
"objection at trial" contemplated by Hollo-
way, a proposition for which he cites no 
supporting authority. There is no question 
that Webb knew of the alleged conflict of 
which he now complains no later than at 
trial. Although his motion for new trial 
could be regarded as sufficient to preserve 
for consideration in this direct appeal his 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim arising 
from counsel's representation of purported-
ly conflicting interests, see People v. Prec-
up, 73 IlL2d 7, 21 Ill.Dec. 863, 382 N.E.2d 
227 (1978); but see Armstrong v. People, 
701 P.2d 17, 21 (Colo. 1985) (issue can be 
considered on direct appeal even if not 
raised in new trial motion), it was untimely 
for purposes of invoking the Holloway au-
tomatic reversal rule, which is based on a 
trial judge's failure to act once on notice 
that there was a possible conflict of inter-
ests between jointly represented codefend-
ants. 
Unlike the pretrial and trial objections of 
the defendant in Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 
98 S.Ct. at 1178, described by the Court as 
"focused explicitly on the probable risk of a 
conflict of interests" between defendants 
represented by a single defense attorney, 
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the record in this case discloses an insuf 
cient basis on which to hold that the tr 
court reasonably should have known befo 
or at trial that the two SLLDA attorne 
were representing codefendants with co 
flicting interests. We therefore conclu< 
that the sixth amendment imposed no s 
firmative duty on the trial judge to act si 
sponte and appoint Webb a non-SLLD 
attorney or inquire into the propriety of tl 
representation of the codefendants by tv 
public defenders from the same office. 
[11] Because the alleged conflict in th 
case was not adequately raised in the tri; 
court until after his conviction, Webb ca 
succeed on his sixth amendment ineffe< 
tiveness of counsel claim only if he demor 
strates both that counsel actively repr< 
sented conflicting interests and that an ac 
tual conflict of interest adversely affecte 
his lawyer's performance. See Stricklanc 
466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Unit* 
States v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256, 1259-6* 
(10th Cir.1984). We conclude that Web! 
has failed to sustain his burden on botl 
points. 
[12,13] In order to show an actual con 
flict of interest existed, a defendant mus 
point to specific instances in the record tc 
suggest an actual conflict or impairment o\ 
his or her interests. Thomas, 818 F.2d at 
481; Bumey, 756 F.2d at 792. There is nc 
violation where the conflict is irrelevant or 
merely hypothetical; there must be an ac-
tual, significant conflict. Thomas, 818 
F.2d at 481. 
Appellants must make a factual showing 
of inconsistent interests and must dem-
onstrate that the attorney "made a 
choice between possible alternative 
courses of action If he did not make 
such a choice, the conflict remained hypo-
thetical." An actual conflict of inter-
est exists when the respective defenses 
of multiple defendants are inconsistent, 
i.e., if "introduction of probative evidence 
or plausible arguments that would signif-
icantly benefit one defendant would dam-
age the defense of another defendant 
whom the same counsel is representing." 
United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1328 
(11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert denied, 
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464 U.S. 991, 104 S.Ct. 481, 78 L.Ed.2d 679 
(1983). Until a defendant shows an actual 
conflict, "he has not established the consti-
tutional predicate for his claim of ineffec-
tive assistance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 
100 S.Ct. at 1719. 
[14] Webb asserts that an actual con-
flict was demonstrated by his trial attor-
ney's pursuit of a united defense with 
Humphrey at a joint trial "in spite of the 
evidence and Webb's desire to impeach the 
testimony of his codefendant." We dis-
agree. This is not a case in which the 
evidence produced against Webb was whol-
ly circumstantial, while that against his 
codefendant was direct. Nor is this a case 
in which the codefendants' interests actual-
ly conflicted because of a substantial dis-
parity of evidence incriminating each defen-
dant, as in Armstrong, 701 P.2d at 22. 
Although there was eyewitness victim tes-
timony identifying Humphrey, not Webb, 
as the robber in the store, the Martindales 
testified to Webb's direct involvement be-
fore and immediately after the crime. The 
two codefendants took the stand and gave 
entirely consistent, corroborative testimony 
to support their claim that the Martindales 
were the real culprits while they were only 
patsies. Webb's counsel aggressively chal-
lenged the reliability of the robbery vic-
tims' identification of Humphrey as the 
robber. 
Under these circumstances, we are con-
vinced that counsel's loyalty was not divid-
ed between Webb and a codefendant with 
actual conflicting interests. See United 
States v. Cantu, 786 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.) 
(per curiam) (no conflict where jointly rep-
resented codefendants charged with con-
spiracy to file false tax returns pursued 
joint defense claiming that neither party 
filed fraudulent returns), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 169, 93 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1986); Mersf 701 F.2d at 1329 (no conflict 
where codefendants pressed same defense 
and corroborated each other); Government 
of Canal Zone v. Hodges, 589 F.2d 207 (5th 
Cir.) (joint alibi defense), cert, denied, 441 
U.S. 948, 99 S.Ct. 2173, 60 L.Ed.2d 1052 
(1979); Wright v. State, 442 So.2d 301 (Fla. 
Dist.Ct.App. 1983) (no conflict of interest 
where jointly tried codefendants in rape 
trial both used consent defense). 
[151 Furthermore, even if we were to 
conclude that the difference in the nature 
of the evidence adduced at trial demon-
strated an actual conflict of interest, Webb 
has failed to demonstrate that it resulted in 
any adverse effect on his counsel's per-
formance. He merely asserts that the con-
flict caused his attorney not to pursue a 
nonunited defense at a separate trial and 
assumes that this is sufficient to demon-
strate an adverse effect. Faced with such 
a claim of omission, however, a reviewing 
court must determine from the record (1) 
whether the arguments or actions allegedly 
omitted would likely have been made by 
other counsel, and (2) whether there was a 
tactical reason (other than the asserted con-
flict) for the omission. People v. Easley, 
46 Cal.3d 712, 759 P.2d 490, 498-99, 250 
Cal.Rptr. 855 (1988). 
There is absolutely nothing in the record 
to suggest that counsel's choice of the unit-
ed defense strategy, which Webb apparent-
ly supported enthusiastically until it pro-
duced an unfavorable verdict, was in any 
way prompted by a desire or effort to 
bolster Humphrey's defense at Webb's ex-
pense. Any reasonably competent counsel 
representing Webb but not Humphrey 
would not have chosen any different de-
fense strategy. Webb would likely have 
gained nothing by abandoning the common 
defense and challenging Humphrey's credi-
bility at a separate trial. On the record 
before us, counsel simply had no other 
defense options to pursue, and Webb has 
suggested none. The frame-up defense, 
coupled with an attack on the robbery vic-
tims' ability to make a reliable identifica-
tion of Humphrey, was the only viable de-
fense tactic available to Webb in light of 
the State's evidence, including Britt Martin-
dale's testimony placing Humphrey and 
Webb together at her home with the jewel-
ry and shotgun shortly after the robbery. 
Therefore, there was a tactical reason, oth-
er than multiple representation of Webb 
and Humphrey, underlying the decision to 
pursue the united defense strategy at a 
joint trial. 
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As the United Suites Supreme Court 
pointed out in rejecting any per se rule that 
would prohibit a single attorney from ever 
representing codefendants, "in some cases, 
certain advantages might accrue from joint 
representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurt-
er's view: 'Joint representation is a means 
of insuring against reciprocal recrim-
ination. A common defense often gives 
strength against a common attack.' " Hoi-
loway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. at 1177-
78 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 92, 62 S.Ct. 457, 475, 86 L.Ed. 680 
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
Because Webb has failed to demonstrate 
an actual conflict of interest which adverse-
ly affected his attorney's performance, we 
reject his claim of ineffective counsel and 
conclude that the trial court properly de-
nied Webb's motion for a new trial. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
A. Execution of Arrest Warrants 
[16] We next consider Webb's attacks 
on the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the shotgun, the ring, and the 
diamond watch. He first contends that the 
seizure of these items violated his fourth 
amendment rights because the arrest war-
rants for him, Humphrey, and Gregersen, 
which form the basis for the lawful pres-
ence of the police officers in the apartment, 
were not executed in the manner pre-
scribed by the prior demand requirements 
in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-7-6, -8 (1982).5 
In essence, Webb argues that any search 
of the apartment following an arrest in 
which the arrest warrants were executed in 
a manner violating these statutes is per se 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment, 
5. Section 77-7-8 provides: 
To make an arrest, a private person, if the 
offense is a felony, and in all cases, a peace 
officer, may break the door or window of the 
building in which the person to be arrested is, 
or in which there are reasonable grounds for 
believing him to be. Before making the 
break, the person shall demand admission 
and explain the purpose for which admission 
is desired. Demand and explanation need not 
be given before breaking under the exceptions 
in section 77-7-6 or where there is reason to 
believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed. 
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requiring application of the exclusioi 
rule. 
However, this statutory noncomplh 
issue was not raised or argued to the 
court as one of the grounds in suppor 
defendant's motion to suppress, either 
fore or at trial. As a result, the trial c< 
made no ruling on whether sections 77-
and -8 were violated and it made no f 
ings to resolve discrepancies in the testi 
ny at the suppression hearing on fac 
questions critical to the statutory none 
pliance issue, such as whether demand 
explanation were actually given, whet 
there was a "breaking" of the apartm 
door, and whether there were facts cor 
tuting an exception to the demand requ 
ments. 
As the Utah appellate courts have r 
erated many times, we generally will 
consider an issue, even a constitutional c 
which the appellant raises on appeal for 
first time. Kg., State v. Anderson, 
Utah Adv.Rep. 15, 16 (1990); Jolivet 
Cook, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. 17, 19 (1989) (c 
el and unusual punishment claim); Statt 
Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 19 
(per curiam) (probable cause to stop 
hide); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 
(Utah 1983) (speedy trial right); State 
rel. M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah Ct.App.19 
(constitutionality of statute). This princi] 
of appellate review has been applied 
fourth amendment challenges to the adrr 
sion of evidence: "[WJhere a defend? 
fails to assert a particular ground for si 
pressing unlawfully obtained evidence 
the trial court, an appellate court will r 
consider that ground on appeal." State 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985); < 
cord State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d IS 
Insofar as it is relevant to the situation prese 
ed in this case, section 77-7-6 does away w 
the prior demand and explanation requirem* 
when 
(1) There is reason to believe the notice u 
endanger the life or safety of the officer 
another person or will likely enable the pai 
being arrested to escapef.) 
A similar argument involving police complian 
with the knock-and-announcc statute applicat 
to executions of search warrants. Utah Co 
Ann. § 77-23-10(2) (1982), was considered I 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Buck, 7 
P.2d 700 (Utah 1988). 
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126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989). The Carter court relied on State v. 
Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah), cert denied, 454 
U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595 
(1981), in which it pointed out that suppres-
sion motions should be supported by pre-
cise averments, not conclusory generaliza-
tions, and held that, in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances, the appellate court will 
not rule on available grounds not addressed 
in the trial court Lee, 633 P.2d at 53; see 
Utah R.Crim.P. 12(a) (grounds for a motion 
must be stated "with particularity"). "[T]o 
entertain the point now would be to sanc-
tion the practice of withholding positions 
that should properly be presented to the 
trial court but which may be withheld for 
purposes of seeking a reversal on appeal 
and a new trial or dismissal." Carter, 707 
P.2d at 661 (quoting Lee, 633 P.2d at 53). 
Exceptions to this general rule consist of 
those cases in which there are "exceptional 
circumstances" for the failure to raise the 
issue below, Jolivet, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. at 
19, or cases where the plain error rule is 
applicable, Anderson, 129 Utah Adv.Rep. 
at 16; State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987); cf. State v. Brecken-
ridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1983) (stat-
ing that the exception applies where a "lib-
erty interest" is at stake). In this case, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest 
that the statutory noncompliance ground 
now asserted by Webb was unknown or 
unavailable to him before or at trial. He 
has not contended that the plain error ex-
ception should apply or that any special 
circumstances justify his failure to present 
this particular ground for the motion to 
suppress to the trial court, nor do we per-
ceive any in the record. We, therefore, will 
not consider the statutory noncompliance 
challenge to the validity of the seizure of 
the evidence, which he raises here for the 
first time. See Carter, 707 P.2d at 661. 
6. A warrantless seizure justified on the basis of 
the "plain view" exception requires: (1) the law-
ful presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain 
view; and (3) evidence which is clearly incrimi-
nating. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 
1986); State v. Holmes. 11A P.2d 506. 510 (Utah 
B. Shotgun 
[171 Webb contends that, even if the 
officers were lawfully present in his apart-
ment for purposes of making the arrests, 
the warrantless search of the bedroom in 
which he was arrested, which led to the 
seizure of the shotgun, was unlawful be-
cause it was not incident to his arrest. The 
factual premise for this argument is that 
the gun was not observed and seized until 
the officers re-entered that bedroom after 
Webb had been arrested and taken from 
the room. Once he was taken from the 
bedroom in handcuffs, Webb argues, the 
bedroom was not "an area within his imme-
diate control," State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 
175, 180 (Utah 1983), that could be re-en-
tered and searched for weapons. The 
State accepts this factual premise and con-
tends that the shotgun was seized in plain 
view' when the police officers, after ar-
resting Webb pursuant to an arrest war-
rant, re-entered the bedroom as part of a 
"protective sweep" to search for other dan-
gerous persons on the premises, see Mary-
land v. Buie, — U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1093, 
108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), prior to conducting 
their intensive search of the apartment pur-
suant to Gregersen's consent. 
We, however, have carefully reviewed 
the record of the suppression hearings and 
find insufficient support in the evidence for 
Webb's version of the events leading to the 
seizure of the shotgun. Detective Dalling, 
who was one of the officers who arrested 
Webb and then was involved in securing 
the written consent from Gregersen, made 
clear that the shotgun had already been 
located prior to her consent to search the 
entire premises, although he was not the 
officer who located the shotgun. In re-
sponse to questioning from attorney Stod-
dard—who appeared confused about 
whether Webb and Humphrey had been 
found in the same bedroom, but in a differ-
ent bedroom from the one in which the 
Ct.App.1989). Webb does not dispute the pres-
ence of the last two elements of the plain view 
doctrine. Instead, he asserts only that the re-en-
try of the police into his bedroom once he had 
been removed from it was unlawful. 
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shotgun was found—Detective Dalling also 
indicated that he had located Webb prior to 
the shotgun being found. Counsel asked 
no further questions on this point to clarify 
which of several officers present in Webb's 
bedroom to arrest him had located the shot-
gun and whether it had been located during 
the time the officers were lawfully present 
to effectuate the arrest, even if it was not 
physically seized until Webb was secured 
and removed to another room. There is 
simply no evidence that, with Webb in 
handcuffs, all the arresting officers left the 
room totally unaware of the shotgun and 
then returned to that room later and dis-
covered the shotgun in plain view for the 
first time. From the testimony presented, 
it appears that the shotgun was located 
while the officers were lawfully present in 
the room to arrest Webb. We therefore 
reject Webb's contentions and conclude 
that, on the evidence before it, the trial 
court did not err in admitting the shotgun 
into evidence. 
C. Jewelry 
Webb next challenges the admission into 
evidence of the diamond watch and the 
ring. He disputes the legality of the war-
rantless search of Gregersen's purse, 
which ultimately resulted in the seizure of 
the diamond watch, by asserting that it 
was not incident to her lawful arrest since 
she was already handcuffed when the 
purse was searched. He also contends that 
the subsequent warrantless search of the 
apartment, during which the ring was 
found in a jewelry box on the dresser in the 
master bedroom, was illegal because Gre-
gersen did not voluntarily consent to it.7 
The State responds that Webb failed to 
establish his standing to raise either of 
these two distinct fourth amendment 
claims and that, even if we conclude Webb 
has standing to challenge the admissibility 
of the ring, he loses on the merits because 
Gregersen voluntarily consented to the 
search of the apartment. 
At the first suppression hearing, Webb's 
counsel contended that the search of Gre-
7. Webb docs not contend that Gregersen lacked 
the power to consent to the search of the apart-
v. WEBB Utah 
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gersen's purse was not incident to her 
ful arrest and that Gregersen's wri 
consent to search the premises was ir 
untary because she was coerced and ui 
duress, mostly out of fear for her 
dren's safety. The State then went 
ward with testimony from the arres 
officers concerning the facts surroum 
the arrests, the search of Gregers< 
purse in conjunction with her arrest, 
the subsequent obtaining of Gregers< 
written consent to search the entire prei 
es. 
According to the officers' testimc 
they encountered Gregersen immediat 
upon entering the apartment. She \ 
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and 
quired to kneel on the living room flo 
Her purse, apparently lying nearby, v 
searched for weapons by one of the arre 
ing officers. Her infant son was placed 
a small crib on the floor next to her. S 
remained in the living room, agitated a 
crying, for six or seven minutes while t 
officers arrested the other two suspec 
Gregersen was then allowed to stand 
and move to a chair at the kitchen tah 
Her older son called her sister to come a 
take custody of the children. The office 
then began asking her questions. Aft 
determining that she paid rent on t 
apartment, they requested her consent 
search the apartment, explaining that th< 
were looking for weapons and for jewel 
taken in the robbery and that she did n 
need to sign the consent form. She wi 
also permitted to smoke, drink coffee, ar 
use the bathroom. When Gregersen toe 
the stand, she stated that her jewelry ws 
kept in her jewelry box on her dresser i 
the master bedroom, but she did not dii 
pute the arresting officer's testimony cor 
cerning the search of her purse. She als 
claimed that she was upset by the police' 
armed entry, that the police would not le 
her hold her crying infant son, and that sh< 
did not remember signing any consen 
form or talking to the officers about \ 
search of the premises. 
ment or the master bedroom in which the jewel 
ry box was located. 
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In his supplemental motion to suppress, 
Webb renewed his challenge to the legality 
of the search of the premises that led to 
the discovery of the ring. This time, his 
motion was grounded on Gregersen's claim 
that the signature on the consent form was 
not, in fact, her signature. At the start of 
the evidentiary hearing, Webb himself took 
the stand as the moving party for the limit-
ed purpose, according to his counsel, of 
"establishing his residence and standing to 
bring [the] motion." In testimony that the 
State did not controvert, Webb stated that 
he resided at the apartment he shared with 
Gregersen, along with their infant child; 
he was actually living there on the date the 
arrest warrants were executed and the 
premises searched; and he monetarily con-
tributed to the support of their household 
by paying half the utility bills and over half 
the rent He did not testify to any interest 
in the purse searched or in the diamond 
watch seized from that purse. 
[18,19) Because fourth amendment 
rights are personal rights which may not 
be vicariously asserted, Alderman v. Unit-
ed States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 
967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), the proponent 
of a motion to suppress has the burden of 
establishing that his own fourth amend-
ment rights were violated by the chal-
lenged search or seizure. Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 
424 n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A person 
who is aggrieved by an illegal search and 
seizure only through the introduction of 
damaging evidence secured by a search of 
a third person's premises or property has 
not had any of his fourth amendment 
rights infringed. Id. at 134, 99 S.Ct. at 
425. "And since the exclusionary rule is an 
attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit 
only defendants whose Fourth Amendment 
rights have been violated to benefit from 
the rule's protections." Id. Therefore, the 
central inquiry in any suppression hearing 
grounded on a purportedly illegal search is 
whether the defendant challenging the ad-
mission of evidence has shown a "legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the invaded 
place." United States v. Salvucci, 448 
U.S. 83, 91-92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2552-53, 65 
L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (quoting Rakas, 439 
U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. at 428). The inquiry is 
the same whether whether the challenged 
search is of premises, such as the apart-
ment in Salvucci, or of a tangible object, 
such as the glove box in Rakas or the 
purse in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98 at 105, 100 S.Ct. 2556 at 2561, 65 
L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). Sec also United 
States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), 
cert, denied, — U.S. , 109 S.Ct. 1742, 
104 L.Ed.2d 179 (1988) (search of travel 
bags). 
[20-22] As this court recently pointed 
out, there is no bright line test to use in 
making this fact-sensitive determination. 
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah 
CtApp.) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 
99 S.Ct. at 430), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1989). A legitimate expectation of 
privacy incorporates two elements: first, 
whether the defendant "exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation lof privacy," and 
second, whether that subjective expectation 
is "one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable." Knox, 839 F.2d at 293 
(quoting United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 
1041, 1044 (6th Cir.1982), cert, denied, 464 
U.S. 933, 104 S.Ct. 337, 78 L.Ed.2d 306 
(1983)); accord California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 212, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1812, 90 
L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). Factors relevant to 
this inquiry include whether the defendant 
had any possessory or proprietary interest 
in the place searched or the item seized in 
the challenged search; was legitimately on 
the premises; had the right to exclude oth-
ers from that place; exhibited a subjective 
expectation that the place would remain 
free from governmental invasion; or took 
normal precautions to maintain his privacy. 
United States v. Haydcl, 649 F.2d 1152, 
1155 (5th Cir.1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 
1022, 102 S.Ct. 1721, 72 L.Ed.2d 140 (1982). 
A defendant's ownership or possession of 
an item seized in the allegedly unlawful 
search is not determinative of whether that 
individual's fourth amendment privacy 
rights in the place searched have been in-
fringed. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. 
at 2553; see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 
99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12. On the other hand, a 
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defendant who establishes a privacy inter-
est in the place searched sufficient to con-
test the legality of that search, in order to 
suppress evidence seized as a product of it, 
is not deprived of fourth amendment stand-
ing to assert that claim merely because 
another person actually owns either the 
evidentiary items actually seized or the per-
sonal effect in which the seized items were 
found. See, e.g., Alderman, 394 U.S. at 
176-77, 89 S.Ct. at 968-69; United States 
v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.1983), cert, 
denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82 
L.Ed.2d 884 (1984); United States v. Ai-
kens, 685 F.Supp. 732, 736 (D.Ha.1988); 
People v. Koury, 214 Cal.App.3d 676, 262 
Cal.Rptr. 870, 874-75 (1989); People v. 
Whisler, 724 P.2d 648, 650-51 (Colo. 1986) 
(Lohr, J., concurring specially); see gener-
ally 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 11.3(a) (1987). 
In Perez, the court concluded that the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his own house sufficient to allow 
him to challenge the constitutionality of the 
search of the house—with the goal of sup-
pressing incriminating items seized during 
the course of that challenged search—even 
though the incriminating items were found 
in a search of handbags and luggage be-
longing to his houseguests. Perez, 700 
F.2d at 1236. The United States Supreme 
Court explained the rationale for such a 
result in Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176-77, 89 
S.Ct. at 968-69: 
If the police make an unwarranted 
search of a house and seize tangible 
property belonging to third parties . . . 
the homeowner may object to its use 
against him, not because he had any in-
terest in the seized items as "effects" 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, but 
because they were the fruits of an unau-
thorized search of his house, which is 
itself expressly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Webb's fourth amendment claim concern-
ing the ring is similar to that of defendant 
Perez. See Perez, 700 F.2d at 1235-36. 
Webb contends his personal privacy rights 
were violated by a warrantless search of 
his home; consequently, evidence found in 
that search (i.e., the ring in the jewelry 
v. WEBB Utah 81 
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box) should be suppressed. To succeed, he 
must first show a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the "invaded place," i.e., the 
apartment, as required by Saltmcci. 
His claim concerning the diamond watch, 
however, is very different. He does not 
contend that the search of Gregersen's 
purse was the fruit of the purportedly un-
constitutional search of his apartment or 
any part thereof. In this case, such a 
contention would be untenable since the 
search of the purse in conjunction with 
Gregersen's arrest preceded the indepen-
dently challenged search of the apartment. 
Instead, Webb seeks to challenge a sepa-
rate search of a tangible object that took 
place in the living room of the apartment 
while the police officers were legally 
present to execute an unchallenged arrest 
warrant. Thus, insofar as Webb's motion 
to suppress the diamond watch is con-
cerned, the "invaded place" in which Webb 
must preliminarily show a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy is the purse, not the apart-
ment. 
[23] With this important distinction in 
mind, we conclude that Webb has standing 
to contest the legality of the extensive, 
two-hour search of the apartment. The 
state did not controvert his testimony that 
he actually resided there with Gregersen 
and their child, in a "common law mar-
riage," and that he contributed to house-
hold expenses, including rent. From this it 
can reasonably be inferred that, as a coresi-
dent, he had the right to exclude all others 
except Gregersen from the apartment. He 
identified the master bedroom, in which the 
jewelry box containing the ring was locat-
ed, as "our" bedroom, implying that it was 
used by him and Gregersen. We conclude 
that Webb established his legitimate and 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
apartment as his home, including the mas-
ter bedroom. Because the challenged gov-
ernmental search of the master bedroom 
and the rest of the apartment infringed on 
Webb's personal fourth amendment rights, 
he may contest the legality of that search 
with the goal of preventing the admission 
of the ring as evidence. 
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[24-27] On the merits of that issue, 
however, Webb fails. A warrantless 
search conducted pursuant to a consent 
that is voluntary in fact does not violate 
the fourth amendment. Schvcckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 
2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). It is the 
State's burden to prove that consent given 
to a search was voluntary. United States 
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 100 S.Ct. 
1870, 1879, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 981 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). Voluntariness is a question of fact 
to be determined from the totality of all the 
circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 
557, 100 S.Ct. at 1878; United States v. 
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 
1986). We deferentially review a trial 
court's finding of voluntary consent, like 
other factual determinations underlying 
the denial of a motion to suppress, disturb-
ing it only if the appellant demonstrates 
that there has been clear error. United 
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st 
Cir.1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 
S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). We 
do so because of the trial court's more 
favorable position to assess the credibility 
of witnesses and resolve conflicting testi-
mony. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258; State v. 
Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). A finding is clearly erroneous if "it 
is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made.' " State v. Goodman, 
763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
However, in evaluating whether a finding 
of voluntary consent is clearly erroneous, 
we are not unmindful of the analysis in 
which a reviewing court must engage to 
insure that the State has met its burden of 
proof on this issue: 
(1) There must be clear and positive tes-
timony that the consent was "unequivo-
cal and specific" and "freely and intelli-
gently given"; (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress 
or coercion, express or implied; and (3) 
the courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against the waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived. 
United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 
(10th Cir.1977) (quoting Villano v. United 
States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)); 
accord Carson, 793 F.2d at 1150; United 
States v. Mcdlin, 842 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
[28,29] When the evidence presented to 
the trial court is measured against these 
standards, we are satisfied that the State 
carried its burden of proof on the voluntari-
ness question, and we conclude that there 
is no clear error here. The fact that Gre-
gersen was under arrest when her consent 
was given, although one relevant factor, 
does not preclude a finding that her con-
sent to search the premises was voluntary. 
See United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 
1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1988). Gregersen 
was concerned for her children and upset 
by the officers' armed entry into her home, 
but there is no evidence that the officers 
continued to brandish their weapons once 
the three suspects were arrested. Her in-
fant son was placed near her to alleviate 
her fears for him. Six or seven minutes 
after her arrest, she was allowed to get up 
from the floor and move to the kitchen 
table, where the police began talking to 
her. The fact that she was allowed to 
drink coffee and use the bathroom upon 
request and that she was not denied any 
other reasonable request suggests that the 
atmosphere in the kitchen at that time was 
not coercive or threatening. An officer 
told her that they were looking for weap-
ons and for jewelry taken in the robbery 
and asked for her consent, which he told 
her she did not have to give. He also 
explained that, if she did not consent to the 
warrantless search, it would not be con-
ducted. Gregersen did not testify to any 
overt or implied threats to her own well-be-
ing or that of Webb or her children. There 
is no evidence that she merely acquiesced 
to the will of the police because she was 
already under arrest or because she be-
lieved they would do it anyway. She was 
shown the straightforward consent-to-
search form by the officer who testified 
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that she read it. She asked no questions 
about it, and indicated no reservations 
about signing it. The preprinted form she 
signed contains statements that the police 
informed her of her constitutional right not 
to have a warrantless search made of her 
premises or property; she knew of her 
lawful right to refuse to consent to such a 
search; she willingly gave her permission 
to the officers "to conduct a complete 
search of the premises and property" locat-
ed at her address and apartment number; 
and she did so "without any threats or 
promises of any kind." Gregersen never 
claimed that she signed the written consent 
form only out of fear or coercion or that 
she misunderstood it; instead, she testified 
that she did not remember signing the 
form or discussing the consent with the 
officers. Under the totality of the circum-
stances, we cannot say that the finding of 
voluntary consent to the search of the 
premises was clearly erroneous. Thus, the 
trial court properly denied Webb's motion 
to suppress the ring found in the search of 
the apartment. 
[30,31] Returning to the matter of 
Webb's standing to contest the constitu-
tionality of the prior search of the purse, 
we conclude that Webb failed to establish 
that he had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the purse at the time it was 
searched. There is no evidence, nor even 
any argument, that Webb owned the purse, 
that he had ever sought or been given 
access to Gregersen's purse, or that he had 
ever put any of his own effects in it. See 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-06, 100 S.Ct. at 
2561-62. At the time of the search, the 
purse was in proximity to Gregersen in the 
living room area, while Webb was in anoth-
er room. Thus, we are left with an object 
belonging to Webb's mate, in which Webb 
asserted no interest, which was searched in 
conjunction with her lawful arrest by police 
whose presence in the apartment was not 
the product of an illegal invasion of Webb's 
privacy rights, leading to the seizure of an 
8. Wc recognize that the court in Perez summari-
ly concluded that a defendant homeowner had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the luggage 
and handbags of his houscgucsts simply because 
he "should have been able to expect that any 
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object in which Webb asserted no interest. 
The only evidence favoring Webb on this 
standing issue is that the purse belonged to 
a person with whom he had an intimate 
relationship and that the purse and its con-
tents were in his home when the challenged 
search occurred. 
Webb is in the same position as the de-
fendant husband in United States v. Gar-
cia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209 (1st Cir. 1989), a 
case relied on by the State and ignored by 
Webb. In Garcia-Rosa, the court noted 
that the United States Supreme Court has 
never recognized a standing doctrine that 
would permit even a spouse to vicariously 
assert the fourth amendment rights of the 
other spouse. The court of appeals held 
that the defendant husband had no stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
search of a box belonging to his wife— 
which was lawfully seized in the couple's 
home while the police were lawfully 
present in the couple's master bedroom— 
because of the husband's failure to estab-
lish that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the box. Id. at 219. On that 
issue, the court in Garcia-Rosa did not 
consider as determinative the fact that the 
box was within the four walls of the cou-
ple's home when searched. The Colorado 
Supreme Court likewise concluded that a 
defendant had failed to establish a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in his girl-
friend's suitcase, even though the suitcase 
was found in a consent search of the apart-
ment in which they both lived. Whisler, 
724 P.2d at 650. An expectation of privacy 
in a room, the Colorado court held, does not 
extend to another person's locked suitcase 
within that room. Id. 
We likewise conclude that the fact that 
Gregersen's purse was within the confines 
of the apartment Webb shared with Gre-
gersen, premises in which he had a legit-
imate expectation of privacy, is alone insuf-
ficient to establish his legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in Gregersen's purse.8 We 
personal property brought into the house by his 
overnight guests would be free from govern-
ment intrusion." Perez. 700 F.2d at 1236. How-
ever, this conclusion appears to be dictum since 
Perez was contesting the admission of the con-
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do not believe that a defendant's privacy 
interest in a common residence necessarily 
extends to a privacy interest in every ob-
ject located inside that residence. See 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725, 
104 S.Ct. 3296, 3308, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Although it is 
possible that Webb could have shown a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in Greger-
sen's purse, he did not meet his burden of 
proof on this point. 
Because Webb failed to show that his 
personal fourth amendment rights were in-
fringed when the arresting officers invaded 
Gregersen's purse—conduct which we 
stress was not the product of any predicate 
illegality violating Webb's fourth amend-
ment rights, sec Whiter, 724 P.2d at 650-
51 (Lohr, J., concurring); see also note 8, 
supra —he may not challenge the legality 
of the search of the purse in order to 
prevent admission of the diamond watch at 
trial. 
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
[32] Webb next challenges the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support his convic-
tion. The standard of appellate review ap-
plicable to such a claim is well settled. We 
review the evidence and all inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989), reversing a jury conviction only 
when the evidence, so viewed, is "suffi-
ciently inconclusive or inherently improba-
ble that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Id. at 124 (quoting State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)); 
accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 
(Utah 1989); State v. Belt, 780 P.2d 1271 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). "So long as there is 
some evidence, including reasonable infer-
ences, from which findings of all the requi-
site elements of the crime can reasonably 
tents of his houscguests' effects as the product 
of a purportedly unconstitutional search of his 
own home. He was not independently contest-
ing the seizure or search of those effects by 
be made, our inquiry stops." Booker, 709 
P.2d at 345. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) 
(1978), a person commits aggravated rob-
bery if, in the course of committing rob-
bery, he or she 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or 
a deadly weapon;I9' or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon an-
other. 
One may be convicted as an accomplice if, 
acting with the mental state required for 
the commission of the offense, he or she 
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to en-
gage in conduct which constitutes an of-
fense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1978). 
Webb does not challenge the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the jury's find-
ing of all the elements of an armed robbery 
in which Humphrey was the principal actor. 
Indeed, Webb does not really contend that 
the physical and testimonial evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of his par-
ticipation as an accomplice in the crime. 
Instead, he argues that we should dis-
regard all the evidence that supports his 
conviction as an accomplice in this armed 
robbery, while his conflicting testimony 
and the physical evidence supporting his 
alibi defense, a receipt issued by a gas 
station in Ely, Nevada, at which Greger-
sen's son worked, should be viewed as if it 
were the only credible evidence presented 
at trial. This is not, however, our role. It 
is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. Booker, 709 
P.2d at 345; State r. Tolman, 775 I\2d 
422, 424 (Utah Ct.App.). cert, denied. 783 
P.2d 53 (1989). 
Russell Martindale testified that Webb 
had solicited him to steal the car eventually 
used as the getaway vehicle in the robbery, 
in which a sawed-off shotgun was used by 
the robber. Russell stole the car and 
police who were lawfully present on the premis-
es. 
9. This provision was recently amended. See 
text at note 10, infra. 
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turned it over to Webb in Salt Lake City 
the day before the robbery. Clothing items 
matching the description of those worn by 
the robber were found in that car. The 
night of the robbery, Webb told Russell 
that he knew someone in Las Vegas who 
could get rid of the "stuff" he and Hum-
phrey had stolen. According to Britt Mar-
tindale's testimony, Webb appeared at her 
home shortly after the robbery on October 
21, 1987, with the man later identified as 
the robber in the trunk of his car. Webb 
removed a canvas bag and a sawed-off 
shotgun from his trunk and took them into 
her house, where he emptied the bag and 
sorted through currency and jewelry later 
found at Webb's apartment and identified 
by the store owner as some of the items 
stolen from him. Webb told Britt that 
everything had gone great and that the 
police had not shown up for a little while. 
He stashed the canvas bag in her kitchen 
and told her not to disturb it. When he 
returned later to retrieve the bag, he told 
her he planned to dispose of it in the river. 
Viewing this testimony and all the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, Verde, 770 P.2d at 124, we 
conclude there was substantial evidence 
upon which the jury could reasonably find 
that Webb solicited, requested, command-
ed, encouraged, or intentionally aided Hum-
phrey in the aggravated robbery of the 
jewelry store with the requisite intent. 
That evidence is not so inconclusive or in-
herently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that Webb committed the crime of aggra-
vated robbery. Although there was con-
flicting evidence presented in support of 
the defense theory that Webb and Hum-
phrey were innocent victims of a set-up by 
the Martindales, which, if believed, would 
have placed Webb in Ely, Nevada, the day 
before, and the day of, the robbery, the 
jury was not obligated to believe that evi-
dence. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 
1056 (Utah 1985). 
OTHER CLAIMS OF TRIAL ERROR 
After careful consideration of the other 
claimed errors on appeal, which Webb as-
v. WEBB Utah 8 5 
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serts require the reversal of his conviction 
and remand for a new trial, we conclude 
that they are meritless and that discussion 
of them is unnecessary. Sec Carter, 776 
P.2d at 888. 
SENTENCE 
(331 The trial judge sentenced Webb to 
serve an indeterminate prison term of five 
years to life for the armed robbery convic-
tion, a first degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302(2) (1978); cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978) (robbery is a second 
degree felony). He also added one manda-
tory year for use of a firearm and a discre-
tionary five years for use of a firearm, 
each to run consecutively to the sentence 
of five years to life. The court enhanced 
the penalties pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-203(1) (Supp.1989), which provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a 
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first 
degree, for a term at not less than five 
years, unless otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law, and which may be for life 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or 
facsimile or the representation of a fire-
arm was used in the commission or the 
furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convict-
ed for a term of one year to run consecu-
tively and not concurrently; and the 
court may additionally sentence the per-
son convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecu-
tively and not concurrentlyf.] 
The mandatory enhancement provision was 
added to the statute by 1977 Utah Laws, 
ch. 88, § 1; the discretionary enhancement 
provision was added by 1976 Utah Laws, 
ch. 9, § 1. This statute has been upheld as 
a valid exercise of legislative authority that 
neither creates a separate offense nor im-
poses double punishment for the same 
criminal act. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 
995 (Utah 1978). As the Angus court ex-
plained, the legislature has the authority to 
increase the degree of a crime where "in-
struments of violence" were used in its 
commission, and to increase the punish-
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nt for the use of specific deadlv weap 
5 considered more dangerous than oth 
> /tf at 994-95 More recently, in St ate 
Spccr, 750 P 2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988), the 
ah Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
hancement is merely part of the penalty 
sed on the specific type of weapon used 
Before 1975, a person committed aggra 
ted robbery pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
76-6-302(1 )(a) if he or she, in the course 
committing a robbery, <4use[d] a deadly 
»apon" Utah Laws 1973, ch 196, 
76-6-302 The subsection was amended 
1975 to the form in effect at the time of 
ebb's conviction, i e a person committed 
gravated robbery if he or she, in the 
urse of committing robbery, "use[d] a 
earm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or 
facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon " 
ah Code Ann § 76-6-302(1 )(a) (1978) 
Webb contends that, under accepted pnn 
)les of statutorv construction, the fire 
m enhancement statute does not apply at 
I to his armed robbery conviction because 
s sentence was already "enhanced" to 
at for a first degree felony as a result of 
e use of a firearm in the commission of 
e robbery He asserts that the legisla 
re's 1975 amendment of the armed rob 
ry statute to specify use of a firearm, 
upled with the subsequent enactment of 
e general enhancement provisions, leads 
an ambiguity about whether the legisla 
re intended the latter to apply to aggra 
ited robbery Such an ambiguity, he 
aims, should be resolved in favor of leni 
See State ? Egbert, 748 P 2d 558, 562 
3 (Utah 1987) Furthermore, the more 
>ecific statute governing robbery with the 
>e of a firearm should control over the 
ore general enhancement statute 
Webb relies exclusively on Simpsoyi v 
ntted States, 435 U S 6, 98 S Ct 909, 55 
Ed 2d 70 (1978), m which the United 
.ates Supreme Court refused to permit 
le sentencing court to enhance the penalty 
>r bank robbery using the general federal 
I Although this change was enacted by Utah 
Laws 1989 ch 170 § 7 (effective April 24 
1989) after the robbcrv and conviction at issue 
in this case we may consider the legislature s 
action in 1989 as persuasive evidence on the 
issue of whether, in the prc-1989 version of 
firearm enhancement statute 18 U S C 
§ 924(c), where the statute setting forth 
the elements of bank robbery, 18 U S C 
§ 2113(a) included an enhancement provi 
sion for a bank robbery committed "bv the 
use of a dangerous weapon or device 18 
U S C § 2113(d) We believe Simpson is 
distinguishable First the starting point 
for the court's construction of the fedcril 
statutes was its holding that section 921(c) 
created a separate offense from that in the 
underKmg federal felony Sunpson 4T> 
US at 10 98 SCt at 912 Thus the 
Simpson court would have had to decide a 
double jeopardy issue if it had interpreted 
the general firearm enhancement stitute 
as applicable to bank robberies committed 
using a firearm In contrast, the Utah 
enhancement statute has been interpreted 
in Angus as not creating a separate of 
fense from the underlying felony, therebv 
eliminating any double jeopardy concerns 
based on being tried twice for the same 
offense which in any event, Webb has not 
raised Second the statutory scheme in 
Simpson involved a specific enhancement 
provision for bank robbery committed with 
a dangerous weapon Here the use of a 
firearm is one clement of the substantive 
crime of armed robbery as defined in the 
version of section 76-6-302(1 )(a) in effect 
when Webb was convicted, that section is 
not an enhancement provision Third the 
Simpson court relied heavily on the legisla 
tive intent it found in the public comments 
of the sponsor of section 924(c), the general 
enhancement statute for firearm use in fed 
eral felonies to the effect that it would not 
applv to section 21H armed bank robber 
ies Here the parties have referred to 
nothing indicating that the legislature in 
tended the general sentence enhancement 
provisions of seetion 76-3-20 J(l) to not ip 
plv to aggravated robbery committed with 
a firearm Indeed, we find legislative in 
tent to the contrary in the recent amend 
ment of the aggravated robbery statute ,0 
that eliminated specific reference to a fire 
section 76-6-302(1 )(a) the legislature intended 
to single out nggnsitcd robbery committed 
uith a firearm for anv kind of special scntenc 
ing treatment See State v Bishop 753 P 2d 
439 486 (Utah 1988) 
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arm or knife and retained only the general 
term "dangerous weapon " Utah Code Ann 
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp 1989), as do the stat 
utes setting forth the elements of other 
"aggravated" crimes, eg, Utah Code Ann 
§ 76-5-103 (Supp 1989) (aggravated as 
sault) Utah Code Ann § 76-6-203 (Supp 
1989) (aggravated burglary) We agree 
with the State that this change to conform 
the language of the aggravated robbery 
statute evinces the legislature's intent that 
the sentence enhancement provision apply 
uniformly to all aggravated crimes, includ 
ing aggravated robbery 
Although it is unclear why the legisla 
ture amended section 76-6-302(l)(a) in 1975 
to add the specific term ' firearm" to the 
aggravated robbery statute since robbery 
committed with a firearm was already cov 
ered by the general term ' deadly weapon" 
retained in the subsection, we conclude that 
the amendment created no ambiguity over 
what penalty the legislature intended for 
robbery committed with a firearm The 
legislature was merely increasing the de 
gree of a robbery committed with the enu 
merated instruments of violence In its 
subsequent adoption of the enhancement 
provision for firearm use in the commission 
of a first degree felonv, the legislature 
exercised its authority to determine that, 
because firearms are more dangerous than 
knives or other deadly weapons, their use 
was more deserving of enhanced punish-
ment See Angus, 581 P 2d at 994-95 
Finally, Webb asserts that, even if the 
enhancement provisions of section 76-3-
203(1) are applicable to his aggravated rob 
bery conviction the trial court erroneously 
imposed a total of six years as the term of 
enhancement Based on the Utah Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the firearm en 
hancement statute as providing for a maxi 
mum enhancement term of five years, 
State v Willett, 694 P 2d 601 (Utah 1984), 
the State concedes that the trial court erro 
neously imposed a six year enhancement 
term 
We, therefore, direct the trial court upon 
remand to reduce the enhancement sen 
tence for use of a firearm in the commis 
sion of the first degree felony of aggrava 
ITY v WALKER Utah 87 
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ted robber} from a total of six vears to a 
total of five vears With this correction of 
the sentence, Webb's conviction is af 
firmed 
BENCH, J , and J ROBERT 
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge 
concur 
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Driver was convicted in the Sixth Cir 
cuit Court, Sevier County David L Mower, 
J , of being in actual physical control of 
vehicle while having blood alcohol level 
of 217' Driver appealed The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J , held that (1) city ordi 
nance under which driver was convicted 
was consistent with statutes, and (2) driver 
was in actual, physical control of truck 
while he was sleeping 
Affirmed 
1 Criminal Law <£=254 2, 260 11(3) 
Stipulated facts were not function il 
equivalent of findings of fact, and, thus 
Court of Appeals was not required to defer 
to trial court's findings 
2 Automobiles <&=316 
Municipal Corporations <£=>592(2) 
Statutory prohibition against driving 
or being in actual physical control of ve 
hide with blood alcohol content of 08^ or 
greater as shown by chemical test given 
within two hours after alleged operation or 
